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HISTORICAL SUMMARY OF THE RUSSIAN WAR:

FROM ITS COMMENCEMENT TO THE PRESENT TIME.

If the most intelligent man moving in common English or French society were suddenly asked to give a brief, a clear, and a connected account of all the transactions of the Russian War—from the beginning of it to its present stage—he would first, perhaps, be surprised that anybody should need such information. But he would immediately be still more surprised to find how difficult it was for him to furnish it; that, instead of being able to state, offhand, in their real order and due arrangement, the facts required, he would be obliged to ask time for reflection; and then, even, time to make some references. He would discover that he had, indeed, in his mind an idea of all the events; but that his impressions, though very vivid respecting the principal particulars, were, after all, a mass of anachronous entanglement and historical confusion.

In some degree, this is always the case upon the occurrence of momentous and protracted international changes—until time has been given to the public to free itself from the first excitements, and


from the multifarious, but transitory, delusions by which they are attended. Perhaps, indeed, the very facilities which now exist for publishing diurnally every premature version which may arrive of affairs interesting to the public, have contributed to heap upon the progressive reports of this great war a burden of crude messages and announcements, which confuse the true chronicle of facts; and, in short, *we have not so much to learn the story as to recall it succinctly, and to unlearn the many successive misstatements of it.* Already, the newspaper records of a single year of stimulating and, to our generation, novel and portentous intelligence—with second versions, and third versions, and corrections and alterations—exceed in bulk the immense history in which Gibbon chronicles the stupendous revolutions, the many memorable conflicts, and the countless European vicissitudes, of fifteen centuries.

It is time to weed this literary wilderness; to preserve only what is valuable; to put even that in its right place; and to supply a

compendious, lucid, and reliable narrative of a conflict which might be said to have been long impending, and yet which virtually took Europe and the world by surprise.

FIRST PERIOD: INVASION OF MOLDO-WALLACHIA; AND STATE OF RUSSIAN TROOPS.

It was towards the end of August, 1853, that the first Vienna Note was declined by the Porte; and not very long afterwards, that the second was peremptorily rejected by the Czar. But nearly three months earlier, orders had been dispatched from St. Petersburg to carry the Russian divisions forcibly across the Pruth into the Turkish territory—thus making war, but not declaring it. On the 3rd of July the order was executed. Those rich corn countries were seized; taxes for the maintenance of eighty thousand troops were imposed by the Czar upon four millions of the subjects of Abdul-Medjid-Khan, and contracts for nine months were based on these new imposts; the Danube, the greatest inland highway of commerce in Europe, was brought under the invader's immediate and stringent control; the Hospodars were deposed; a Pro-



ROMANUND.—GENERAL BODISCOE, THE RUSSIAN GOVERNOR, SURRENDERING HIMSELF TO THE ENGLISH AND FRENCH.

visional Administration, at the head of which Prince Michael Gortschakoff was nominated to represent with supreme powers the undefinable Protectorate of Nicholas, was established; and, in short, the Czar, carried into effect the very claims concerning the admissibility of which he was at the same time holding an illusory discussion with all Europe. The movement was made suddenly and rapidly. In the very first instance fifty thousand troops—of which, perhaps, a third was cavalry, and which were attended with proportionate parks of artillery (seventy-two guns, in fact, of large calibre)—were pushed into Moldavia; and these troops were virtually but the advanced guard of the intended army of occupation. Two immense lines of march—one from the centre of European Russia, and another, equally long, from the very confines of Asia, were all alive with armed men, succeeding each other, and pressing forward to a common destination. From Kherson and Kief moved those who were to replace the garrison of Bessarabia; and the vacant and remoter cantonments were, in their turn, supplied by the advancing columns of Taurida and the Don Cossacks of Pultowa and the Ukraine. They came—the children of ancient and barbarous races—various in costume, in stature, in complexion, in manners, in arms; but all gathered and drilled into the one huge system of military tyranny and religious fanaticism. The worst and cheapest troops came first. This method is essentially Asiatic. We picked our men to send the most efficient; and the French have included, in their expeditionary divisions, a part at least, and a large part, of their best soldiery; and if, when these had gone, the army of the Baltic consisted of very young soldiers, they were at least armed, provisioned, accoutred, and trained with even additional liberality and more scrupulous caution. Very different from such troops were the Russian soldiers who now poured into Moldavia. Perhaps there is no armed body in the service of the Czar which ever derives the full and fair measure of provisions, of clothing, and of equipment, represented on paper by their cost. If there be such a body, it is that of the 60,000 or 70,000 Guards. The chief particular in the annual expenses of the State is that of the support of its armaments; and, in theory, the country being considered, sufficient sums are, perhaps, apportioned to the purpose. But in practice these sums are misappropriated; a great part of the money is intercepted before it can reach the soldier. Corruption and venality corrode all departments of the military administration. The Guards being constantly under the eye of the Sovereign, escape most of the frauds, which, where they can be practised, injure alike the treasury of the State, and the comfort and efficiency of its defenders. In less favoured regiments, a gold imperial must be spent, in order to do badly, what a silver rouble ought to have done well. The Colonels grow rich, while the soldiers perish of cold and want.

But when it is the system to select for the first hardships of every enterprise, that part of the soldiery who are the most reduced and damaged by the effect of these practices, it may easily be conceived in what condition some of the half-starved Russian divisions, after a fatiguing march through difficult countries, appeared in the Principalities. We speak not of those who had but to cross the Pruth from the borders of Bessarabia, but of the great masses who were simultaneously hurried from distant points to support the advanced guard. The first hardships, in truth, were not for the first comers. These were naturally the nearest. Osten-Sacken's corps was in movement behind, when Gortschakoff and Lüders were entering the Turkish territory.

The Czar had long succeeded in raising a party in his favour in Moldo-Wallachia; but, be it observed, it was only a party; it was not the people, it was such a party as he has in Prussia, or in Baden. That such a party existed in the Principalities, is proved by the fact that, before the Russians had sent one soldier across the Pruth, the Divan of Moldavia assembled, on the 14th of June, at Jassy, and there voted an address of sympathy and homage to the Emperor Nicholas. Under the circumstances of the crisis, sympathy and homage amounted to an invitation, which he scarcely needed.

Five days after Prince Gortschakoff had passed the frontier stream (more fatal than the Rubicon), he assisted at a "Te Deum," which was intoned with solemnity at St. Spiridon, the great Greek Church of Jassy.

A week later—that is, on the 15th of July—instead of the seventy-two guns with which the Russians had entered the country, they possessed in Jassy alone 144 heavy pieces of artillery; and this great park and 40,000 men were instantly directed to advance upon the Danube. In another fortnight, having put this formidable column upon the march, Prince Gortschakoff was 160 miles away, at Bucharest, exchanging compliments with the Bishops, who had there assembled to give him welcome. Thus he was solemnly received in the respective chief cities of the two provinces. Between his stay in the first of these capitals and his arrival in the other, Ghika, the Hospodar, had sent to the Sultan a memorial of so equivocal a nature that it was considered a renunciation of the Ottoman allegiance. Under this impression, which was perhaps just, Abdul-Medjid deprived him at once of the title to that office, from the exercise of which he had already been practically excluded. First the Russians robbed him of the possession, and then the Divan deposed him from the dignity. The invaders, with whom he temporised, terminated his jurisdiction *de facto*; and the Suzerain, whom he betrayed, abrogated *de jure*. Ghika shortly afterwards explained his conduct, and was re-admitted into partial confidence at Constantinople.

The Czar felt that he had now taken steps from which he could not recede without incurring humiliations abroad which might impair his authority at home, and, perchance, imperil his dynasty. The armaments of Russia, therefore—to use a favourite term of our diplomats—proceeded with such activity, that they were apparent to the most casual observation; and, not content with the resources in his hands, the Autocrat decreed, on the 23rd of July, a new conscription of seven in the thousand. Meanwhile, a concentric despatch of troops was continued from all the southern provinces of the empire upon Bessarabia. They arrived, diseased, ill-provisioned, exhausted, after a desolating march of sometimes thousands of miles, over roadless countries.

MEASURES TAKEN BY THE DIVAN; AND FIRST PROCEEDINGS OF THE INVADER.

On the other side, the Sultan was not inattentive to events, nor unequal to his dangerous and difficult position. He had to provide against attacks in Asia, as well as to guard the European seat of his Government. So early as the 23rd June, Selim Pacha was nominated Seraskier in Anatolia, and a large army was placed under his command. The choice of this officer was as unfortunate as that of Omer Pacha in Europe was judicious and happy. The first object was to provide against the advance of the Russians from Georgia along the southern shores of the Black Sea—an advance which, unopposed, would place Constantinople in a worse position than if the invaders, having forced the Balkans, lay encamped in the European province of Roumelia, which corresponds to the home counties of London. In this other position, the capital might still rescue the empire; and, with the Allied fleets in the Bosphorus, and off the Golden Horn, might await events with tranquil defiance. More than this, a Russian army in Roumelia might be said to have crossed the Balkans only to perish. A victory near Adrianople, over a fresh and vigorous Anglo-French army,

would, to those wearied troops, be a moral impossibility; while retreat over the mountains would offer the alternative of certain annihilation. But, if a large force from the Transcaucasian provinces could succeed in pushing through Erzeroum and Trebizond, and occupying Anatolia; then both the Channel of Constantinople and the Straits of the Dardanelles would be effectually commanded by the enemy; the key of the entrance of the Black Sea would be in his hands; and he could imprison in those waters, or exclude from them, the maritime defenders of the Porte. A favourable moment would then allow the Russian legions to be thrown across into the very metropolis.

This Asiatic danger being averted, Omer Pacha was appointed the Turkish Generalissimo in Europe; and so soon as the news of Prince Gortschakoff's invasion had reached the Divan, Omer was ordered to break down all the bridges over the Danube, and immediately to adopt what strategic measures he deemed advisable for the defence of the State. This was on the 11th July. At that time the French were holding their camp at Helfaut, and we our camp at Chobham. There was a great and unaccustomed activity in all our dockyards and arsenals. The same noise of preparation resounded in France. But the fleets were still in Besika Bay. We feared not that we could be locked out from the future scenes of naval conflict; Woronzoff and his troops were a thousand miles inland to the East, the Turkish levies of the new Seraskier lay between, and the castles of the Dardanelles were in the proper custody. All this was true, and we knew it; but not one great General was in the service of Russia, a fact on which we could not then presume; and one great General, aided by fortune, and commanding in Armenia, might have reversed the conditions we have enumerated and made a speedy and disastrous change in all the circumstances of the situation. It was still a time of political suspense; and while Omer Pacha was proceeding to the Danube and Prince Gortschakoff was exercising all the despotic powers of a conqueror in the Turkish territory beyond that river, actually pressing into his service by forced enlistment the very Boyards whom he could not induce by persuasion to join the cause of the invaders; while the Grand Duke Constantine was at Odessa, urging forward with vehemence the concentration of troops, the outfit of vessels, and the accumulation of all the means of an immediate and desperate struggle; while Italy and Hungary and Poland displayed new signs of disquietude; while Austria was repairing her financial resources and silently collecting her military strength; while Servia and Bosnia were breaking into insurrection; while the Ottoman Empire was convulsed with its prodigious exertions to use and yet to control the explosive passions which now raged and ravened for a vent—while, for example, at Aleppo, on the 9th of August, a conspiracy to murder all the Christians was with difficulty assuaged (rather than suppressed); while already the clash of arms began to be heard, and blood to flow, on the banks of the Danube;—while this was the state of Europe, war was yet nowhere declared, *not even by Turkey*. And to show the wonderful delusion of men's minds, we may mention that so late as the 17th of August the Austrian Consul-General at Bucharest announced in a letter which was at once published, that he had received positive news of the establishment of peace.

Trade was not yet quite suspended, and corn was shipped from Odessa in very considerable quantities, just twelve days before the Austrian Consul's very Austrian announcement. But great storms began now to sweep the Black Sea, while the presence and the proceedings of the Russians in Greater Wallachia imposed new difficulties on the export of grain from that important cereal outlet and emporium. On the 25th, it was known that one thousand vessels would be required at the Sulineh Mouth to ship the arrears. It is, therefore, not surprising, if we take this as but a sample of the difficulties arising, that something very nearly approaching to a dearth was felt at the close of 1853. That year, which had begun, with so fair a promise, ended in gloom and alarm. A scarcity prevailed; a pestilence impended; after forty years of peace, improvement, and civilisation, a vast war, to be waged with new and more terrible implements of destruction, was at hand; and none could promise themselves that they should witness its termination.

Darker and darker, by swift gradations, became the colour of events. The cholera and the hosts of General Lüders were heard of together in Bessarabia, and together they entered Brailow. On the 1st of September the Sultan ordered an immediate additional levy of 80,000 men, which was answered on the 24th by a ukase of the Czar, calling out a new conscription, though he had, *only two months and a day before*, by a similar measure, torn so many thousands of his wretched serfs (the only wealth of the Muscovite Boyards) from their agricultural labours.

Four days after the Sultan's Hatti Sherif, Prince Gortschakoff, who was at Bucharest, about twenty-five miles from the great river which he had orders to pass, issued a proclamation, concluding with these extraordinary words:—"Russia is called to annihilate Paganism, and those who would oppose her in that sacred mission shall be annihilated with the Pagans! Long life to the Czar! Long life to the Deity of the Russians!" So the expressions have been, and, no doubt, with literal exactitude, translated. But it is quite evident that the virtual meaning, in Russ, of the words rendered by "long life to," is "hurrah for," and that the mention of the Supreme Being, by a brutal and illiterate soldier, unused to composition, was intended as merely symbolical of the particular religious cause for which he was come to do battle. But, even, with this palliation, a more barbarous manifesto could scarcely be cited; and the precedence given to the cheer for the Czar over the cheer for the Czar's Maker (unless a climax was intended by the accomplished author), indicates the very peculiar nature of Russian fanaticism. In truth, fanatics have always fought well; and these poor slaves fight badly. Therefore they are not real fanatics. We shall find, in addition to this, that they are badly led by their generals; and it is a very curious fact, which the history of the present war seems likely to corroborate, that Russia never yet produced a leader of troops who was of the highest order. Every other great military nation can, in its own annals, point to scores of such commanders—except, indeed, Prussia; and Prussia has not, perhaps, been long enough a Power of Europe to have yet produced another Frederick.

Two days after Prince Gortschakoff's proclamation, the sentiments of the Wallachians might be conjectured from the proceedings to which the Russian General was obliged to resort. Several Boyards were arrested on the charge of corresponding with Omer Pacha. And what if this were true? War was not declared; Russia herself was at pains to represent the invasion of the Principalities as no invasion at all; but, emphatically, a peaceful occupation, executed without the least breach of amity between the Czar and that Potentate, who, besides, was certainly the Sovereign of these Boyards. Yet they are cast into prison, for being but suspected of writing to a high officer in the service of their own Monarch, the Czar's good friend.

On the 10th, the French Ambassador to the Porte, became so uneasy that, on his own responsibility, he ordered three French frigates, and Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, yielding to his persuasions, ordered, in like manner, three English frigates, to ascend the Sea of Marmora, and to moor at the entrance of the Bosphorus. This was but a slight and scrupulous demonstration. Far more decisive ad-

vances of the enemy were progressively occurring; and Giurgevo, on the north bank of the Danube, facing Rustchak, was selected, instead of Fokschani, at the base of the Crapack hills, to be the scene of the chief Russian camp. The mouths of the river were now filled with corn, which could not be exported. These accumulations, on the 17th of September, amounted to 40,000 kilogrammes of white wheat, 9000 of red, 16,000 of maize, and 25,000 of rye.

The last fruitless diplomatic effort before Turkey declared war—an effort on the one side to come to an understanding, and on the other to overreach, Europe—was the conference at Olmütz, where the Czar tried his personal influence over the young Emperor Francis Joseph. Nicholas arrived at Warsaw on the 20th of September, and thence reached Olmütz on the 23rd. Seven days later, he was again at Warsaw, disappointed and baffled, as it was commonly imagined, in all the objects of his late visit—a visit which had not been undertaken until Envoy after Envoy (each of higher reputation than his predecessor) had failed at Vienna. We know not, for our part, with what understanding the two Monarchs separated. The subsequent conduct of Austria is, perhaps, the best light by which we can guide our conjectures; and, whatever praise may be due to Francis Joseph, this reflection will occur to everybody, that he might have earned a still higher praise, for he might have prevented the European conflict altogether.

As if to alarm England, the exaggerated statements of Russia's power, and of her means of war, were accompanied by the announcement of occasional victories, menacing India in their results. Thus, we now heard how General Perewski, Governor of Orenburg, had stormed Ahmetzi, and had laid open the road to Khiva.

SECOND PERIOD: HOSTILITIES AFTER TURKEY, BUT BEFORE ENGLAND AND FRANCE, HAD DECLARED WAR.

It was not till the beginning of October that the Sultan, who could wait no longer for the Allies, and, indeed, no longer restrain the eagerness of his own people, formally declared war against Russia, and decreed that 150,000 fresh troops should be raised and organised at once, for the defence of Islam. The Czar, when this heroic act of the "sick man" was announced to him, declared that, "from that moment forth, he retracted all his concessions." What his concessions had recently been to Turkey, or what concessions he meant, it would have been perplexing to determine.

The declaration of war could not have been further delayed. Even before it was possible for the news to have reached the Danube, about 1800 Redifs suddenly passed the river, and made a foray on the Russian side. They met part of Lüders' division, fought their way successfully to the water's edge, and recrossed in safety with their spoils.

Omer Pacha had been diligently employed in organising his wild troops since the early part of July; and, with the aid of some European officers (chiefly French), belonging to the Artillery, Engineers, and other military classes and denominations, he soon saw himself at the head of an army in which he could place confidence, and which proved itself equal to all the exigencies of the war. The Turks are patient and hardy in the field; their courage—where they have not reason either to distrust or to despise their own commander—is proverbial, and has been proverbial for more than four hundred years. But since they first broke into Europe, many improvements in the material instruments of war have necessitated corresponding changes in the tactics of an army. Mahmoud, the late Sultan, perceived this; and he determined to revolutionise his military establishment, and to substitute the "Frank" weapons and the "Frank" discipline for the arms and system of his people. After he had destroyed the Janissaries, and before he could supply their place with his new troops, came the last Russian invasion. How absurd it would be to draw any conclusion respecting the comparative efficiency of Turkish and Russian soldiers, from the events of that war may be perceived at a glance. A regular Russian army encountering, not a regular Turkish army, but a rabble of armed Turks, who had just abandoned their national mode of battle and had not acquired familiarity with even the rudiments of the new system, cannot, by its exploits, give us any criterion whatever by which to judge whether such an army of Russians ought, or ought not, to defeat a proportionately numerous Turkish force, well disciplined, well equipped, and well commanded.

The problem was soon to be solved in a manner which astonished all Europe. Omer Pacha, having duly received notification that war was declared, granted yet three weeks to all neutral flags to pass to and fro on the Danube, and proclaimed that this licence would terminate on the 25th of the month then current, October. All Russian subjects resident in Turkey were placed under Austrian protection. The election of the monk Anthinos to the Patriarchate of Constantinople—although he had two competitors of the Russian party, who would have given 60,000 piasters for the post—shows the feeling which at this date, prevailed in the capital. There was no necessity for our fleets to remain where they unhappily did remain all that year. The Russians were diligently using the Black Sea as a highway for the movement of troops, the re-arrangement of strategic posts, and the transit of provisions, arms, and ammunition. For example, 5,000 Russian soldiers, whom the fleets might have intercepted, were landed in October at Kedout Kaleh to succour the army of the Caucasus, and to attack Batoum; and many operations which have since entailed severe fighting and great bloodshed, in Asia as well as in Europe, were by our supineness and hesitation (for we could have paralysed in a moment all those movements) allowed to be quietly accomplished. On the 1st November M. de la Cour was recalled, and General (now Marshal) Baraguay d'Hilliers appointed Ambassador at Constantinople on the part of the French Emperor.

BATTLE OF OLTENITZA.

It was the next day (November 2nd) that Omer Pacha began to cross the Danube. He had been ordered by the Turkish Government to break down all the bridges. That this alone would have been a very inadequate precaution, the finished soldier who was charged with the protection of Turkey, perfectly well knew. But it is very frequently possible to do more towards defending a river on the enemy's side of it than on your own—on the farther, in fact, than on the hither bank. A long line of river cannot, with equal forces, be so guarded as to hinder the enemy from somewhere crossing it in strength; but, firstly, such a position may be taken as to place him at a disadvantage when he does cross; and, secondly, the defender of the river may himself cross, and strike a heavy blow against the enemy in some unguarded and vulnerable point, and then return, to watch for another chance. Omer Pacha adopted both these plans. Establishing securely his communications with the sea through Varna, and rendering Schumla, at the distance of thirty miles inland, impregnable, he collected such a force of infantry and artillery around and within easy reach of that powerful basis that by always refusing, as military men say, the right wing of his position, and throwing the left forward, which it will be seen he did throughout, he was sure, at the very least, of fulfilling his trust, and of defending the remainder of Turkey effectually. For of two things, one—either the troops thus thrown diagonally forward and outward from his left hand would succeed in defeating the Russians, in which case all was well; or the more advanced wing would have to retire. In this case it was diagonally drawn back as it had been thrown forward, gaining more and more strength as th

Russians retained less and less, and as it approached the powerful basis of the position, viz., the right flank resting on Schumla, Varna, and the sea. Now either the Russians would, in that position, fight a general battle (and Omer Pacha could not be better pleased than by such a proceeding on their part), or they would retreat to secure their subsistence. To turn Omer Pacha's position by their right, which would be the furthest removed from their magazines and supports, and then, while his army lay unharmed and complete in their rear, to venture by a large circuit, first towards the west, and subsequently southwards, would be to allow him to destroy them at his leisure—which would probably be before they had arrived, starving, at the foot of the Balkans.

Having taken these defensive precautions and having collected a disposable body sufficient for his purpose, he determined to divert the Russians from passing the Danube, by passing it himself. His sudden presence would compel the enemy to much marching and counter-marching, perhaps even to a great concentration of troops—operations not performed without serious fatigue, or without disturbing the combinations, and arresting the more general designs of the hostile commander. Besides all this, he might inflict some direct and severe loss on the enemy. But the great object was, by a bold movement, to animate and cheer his own troops, and to dispel the delusion of Russian superiority.

The arrogance of Prince Gortschakoff, favoured Omer Pacha's project, in two ways; first, to defeat him after he had assumed so high a tone, and after he had spoken of "annihilating the Pagans," would produce only the greater moral effect, if it could be done; and secondly, that very arrogance and over-security of the Prince and his Lieutenants, made it more easy to be done. Omer Pacha's first movements perplexed the Russians; and this effect, which was certainly obtained, may excuse a rather too bold extension and projection of that elastic left wing which we have described. The extremity of that wing stretched westward far beyond the junction of the Aluta, and hovered menacingly around Lesser Wallachia; and, if Prince Gortschakoff's commissariat had allowed him to collect the mass of his troops against the centre of so long a line (upwards of 200 miles), he might at once have split it into two, and forced the Danube. But, in war, time is of as much importance as space; and Omer Pacha was perfectly well informed of the state of the Russian preparations. Add to this that the enemy's position was itself so straggling as to make it less unsafe and less strategically incorrect to diffuse and scatter his own, in pursuance of any objects then in view. Accordingly, he proceeded to seize an island far up the Danube, between Widdin and Kalafat, where a strong body belonging to his left wing intrenched themselves firmly. Prince Gortschakoff could not conceive what was intended. He adjourned for the moment his own passage of the Danube, and even took measures to protect his right from being turned, and a disaster incurred in Lesser Wallachia. Taking some troops, he, on the 1st November, hurried to Slatina on the Aluta, and suspended or altered all the plans of his campaign. Omer Pacha, tranquil and firm, saw that amongst other things, the effects of a diversion were produced. Since the 19th of October he had busily but secretly collected 200 gun-boats at Rutschuk, and with these he flung two or three thousand men across, who intrenched themselves near Giurgevo. While the Russians were assembling to storm this position, which was certain to cost them a greater loss than they could inflict, the sword of Omer had but dazzled their eyes. Every push told indeed, but the first few passes were only the bewildering play of a good weapon in a firm and skilful hand, and were intended to secure the opening for a more fatal thrust driven home with greater vigour.

On the 2nd of November, and on the 3rd and 4th, he forced his passage fifteen miles lower down from Turtukai to Oltenitza, with 13,000 men. The Russians were numerically much stronger. But they had been, in part, perplexed respecting the designs, and even respecting the presence of the Turkish Generalissimo; in part, they were out-maneuvred during the actual operations, and in part they were beaten fairly on the field. The Turks forced the passage with artillery, held it manfully by the bayonet, and then secured it with spade and pickaxe. The conflict lasted, omitting the intervals which interrupted it, for three-and-twenty hours; and will ever be memorable under the name of the Battle of Oltenitza. It was at the very time during which it was contested that Nicholas was exclaiming in his distant capital, "*non confundar in aeternum*."

The combat, and the manner of it, deserve a special description. At Turtukai, or just below it, the Danube is about 1200 yards across; but there is an island between the two shores, which island is 600 yards distant from the south, and 200 yards distant from the north bank. Now, as the Russian margin of the river descends almost to the water's edge, whereas the Turkish shore rises to the immense height of 600 feet, it is quite evident that the Russians, had they even occupied that island, could not have kept it for half an hour against the Turkish artillery from the opposite eminence. But they attempted not to occupy it; and Omer Pacha, taking it with perfect security and sensible advantage, planted thereon a strong battery; for the island, though commanded by the south shore, commands the north, and commands it irresistibly. All these operations of Omer were managed with the calmness and precision of an able game of chess; and the step we have just described was the first important move. As it was of decisive value to put in use this battery on the island, so it was equally desirable that it should not play over the disembarking Turks—an aim which, if it can be avoided, is too nice and critical for a chance-medley and hand-to-hand encounter, such as was certain to ensue. For this reason, the landing point was chosen not directly in front of the island, but lower down, and to the right, so that the battery mentioned should effectually protect the Turkish left, by enfilading its assailants. To protect the Turkish right the largest guns which Omer possessed were placed by him in battery on the south shore still lower down. They had to clear a range of 1200 yards. The Turks thus protected, and at first only 3000 strong, crossed one river, but landed from the waters of two. A little stream, called the Argish, flowing from the north, seems to refuse the Danube just as it is about to fall into that great river, and, taking a short parallel sweep to the east, then turns again to the south for a few yards, and effects its confluence. Here the Turks landed, and spreading somewhat to the left, had, of course, on that flank and in their rear the bending stream of the Argish. In front of their left and of their centre, the ground was full of copse-wood—in front of their right it was open. They had intrenched themselves by ten o'clock in the morning of November 2nd.

At eleven o'clock a cloud of Cossack skirmishers attacked them, and were followed by four columns of infantry and twenty cannon. Large masses of cavalry immediately afterwards appeared against the rear of the Turks, the only part of the field where horse could manoeuvre. We need say no more; the nature of the position speaks for itself. The Russians could on that day collect but 8000 men, and these were with ease repulsed; for, though the occupants of the intrenchments were but 3000, that number was sufficient, with the advantage of their field works; and there was the protection of the river batteries besides. Next day the Russians were in greater number, but the Turks had also been reinforced incessantly, and, moreover the intrenchments were

stronger. Omer Pacha gained a second victory, precisely like the first. On the 4th of November the third and greatest attack was made. The Russians were now 30,000 strong, while Omer had flung into this venturesome and forward outpost all the men he could spare, amounting to 18,000.

A very protracted and desperate engagement ensued. There was, what even Frenchmen and Englishmen would call, real fighting. The Turkish left was impregnable, and as it was both very uninviting, and had in front of it covered ground and brushwood, where the enemy lay, the carnage was here not great. But on the Turkish right, which was assailed over an open and level space, a fearful slaughter ensued. The Russian infantry tried to storm this side. When first advancing, they were mowed down in whole companies by the Turkish artillery from the south bank; on their nearer approach, the fire of the Turkish musketry, and even pistol shots, discharged from behind a cover which forbade any effective retaliation, continued to shake their array and thin their ranks. But "they would not be refused." They reached (in some disorder, it is true, and much weakened, but still they reached) the foot of the earth-works. At this time the Osmanlis had hardly lost a man since morning. A sudden shout arose among them, they leaped over their own intrenchments, and charged the astonished, decimated, and already half-broken assailants with the bayonet, routing them completely. The movement could not extend far, on account of the Russian cavalry, which prohibited all pursuit. In many respects, it was a very peculiar contest; and we can account for the smallness of the number slain, on the side of the Turks. It is stated to have been under twenty. The Russians lost a thousand men. Omer Pacha, all this time, showed the temperament of a Turk, instead of that of a German, which he is. He is an Austrian of the name of *Lattes*, a soldier of fortune, who has become a great General, and has secured to himself, already, a considerable place in history. During the engagement, he remained on his own side of the river. He had taken every measure in his power. He had done what he could do to ensure victory; and he now watched the varying phases of the action while smoking his pipe. He was quietly seated on the high ground with a celebrated stranger, who was present through motives of professional curiosity—General Prim, the Spaniard. They gazed on the scene through telescopes, seated, with their feet comfortably stretched towards a large wood fire. They saw the test-fight of an army hitherto untried, and they saw its victory.

Our endeavour has been so to describe the operations of this memorable day that a civilian might understand them. We wish our readers also to appreciate with discrimination the abilities of Omer Pacha. His military genius is solid, rather than dazzling.

After this event, the Turkish position seemed to be, for some time, that of assailants, much more than of men acting on the defensive. They occupied both sides of the Danube, in the most important places. We have seen how they stood at Turtukai and Oltenitza. These Turks were but part of the same division which held Rustchuk and Giurgevo, and were led by Omer in person. Sistova, Nicopolis, and Rahova were also in their hands. They had, under the command of Ismail Pacha, crossed the river at Widdin, and not only had seized Kalafat, but had entered Kalarasch with 4000 men. They had placed two thousand men on an island, as though they would hold both the banks, and likewise what lay between.

Nine days elapsed before the Russians ventured again to attack the Turkish redoubt between Oltenitza and the river. They were waiting for reinforcements. The season was now growing late; but as rapidly as its rigours would allow, large reinforcements were poured from Bessarabia into the Principalities. These were not the reinforcements to which we allude, and which the Russians at Oltenitza were awaiting; they expected strategic succours rather, which they could command by the recall of their scattered divisions, and the reparation of Prince Gortschakoff's mistakes. On the 11th, they again attacked the stubborn intrenchments. General Engelhardt had arrived with the reserves. They were repulsed with loss. They then endeavoured to mask the position; and, by getting possession of the island for even an hour, to force this out-garrison, on their own bank, to lay down its arms. All these attempts were unsuccessful; and, on the 14th of November, they were even forced to look more to defence and less to attack; for, on that day, the Turks had the spirit and strength to make an outburst; and, having fallen upon Oltenitza itself, and ravaged its suburbs, retired without loss. On the 26th Omer Pacha established a bridge between the south shore and the island of Moka or Mokannon, higher up the Danube, not far from Giurgevo; and, about the same time, he withdrew the troops which were in position on the farther bank in front of Turtukai, and under Oltenitza; and though retaining also the island of Ramadan, he was obliged to concentrate his soldiers rather more, in the face of the ever-increasing numbers of the enemy.

A GENERAL SURVEY.

This was the true situation of affairs when an absurd rumour, which arrived on the 17th of November, threw London and all England into commotion, after having terrified Vienna and excited the Continent. It was reported that, by a series of most brilliant victories—the details of which were at present wanting, but likely to come by the next mail—the Turks had driven the Russians with great carnage beyond Bucharest, which was on fire "in three places." The circumstantial appearance of this statement reflects credit on the judgment of its inventors—who had doubtless their motives for paltering so shamefully with the public anxiety. Similar fabrications, such as that the Turks had advanced towards Krajova, offering a battle which General Fishback declined, sustained the wonder of distant cities, while the Turks were very prudently drawing more together, and evacuating Oltenitza, Giurgevo, and Kalarasch. In reality, Omer Pacha was reducing the length of his line; but he took care both to conceal the movement, and to strike whatever blows fortune permitted. He still held Kalafat, while, at a distance of nearly three hundred miles from that position by the convex road which he was obliged to use (though at a much shorter distance through Wallachia), he gave the Russians a severe check at Matchin, in the north of the Dobrudscha, facing Brailow. The enemy began to respect a man to whom they ascribed the endowment of ubiquity. Ubiquity, however, is not true generalship; and the quasi-ubiquity of rendering it impossible to the Russians to guess where they should meet him next,—this, with what might result from rapidity of movement, was the only ubiquity to which Omer Pacha aspired.

The Russians imagined that they had built a house, where they indeed had but pitched a tent; and, as if they were permanently fixed in the Principalities, General Budberg was now nominated by the Czar President of the Civil Administration of Moldavia. The appointment was worth one year's purchase.

A little incident occurred on the 17th, in which we think we recognise Russian agency; we allude to the reconciliation, at Frohsdorf, between "Henry the Fifth" on the one part, and (in the name of the whole Orleans family), the Duc de Nemours, on the other. The reconciliation took place seven years too late. We doubt if it could ever have prevented the reign of Napoleon III.; but certainly it has not shaken his throne.

For a fortnight nothing of importance happened; though it is worth while to mention that the same Russian war-ship, *Vladimir*, whose daring and skilful sally afterwards from Sebastopol (when we supposed that port to be securely blockaded by the Anglo-French squadrons) extorted the admiration of Europe; that same ship *Vladimir* on the 20th of November, 1853, spread terror along the Bulgarian coast, where she captured and carried away a Turkish pepper vessel and an Egyptian war-steamer of ten guns.


MASSACRE AT SINOPE.

We need not pause long upon the infructuous, if not apocryphal exploits, in Asia, of Selim Pacha, who was reported about the same date to have stormed Saffa, and to have won a battle at Gumri, or Alexandropol, on the 13th. Five days later, Ali Pacha was beaten at Akhalzick by General Andronikoff. A more decisive event now arrests our attention. The terrible 30th of November arrived. Six Russian ships of the line, with several smaller vessels of war, suddenly filled the aperture of the harbour of Sinope. There were in port thirteen Turkish sail, unprepared for action, and not expecting it. But had they even received warning, their whole fleet was no match for the six Russian first-rates, without counting the powerful frigates and other war craft by which they were supported. We must here observe that, when the Sultan had declared that he was at war, he, in one sense, merely announced a fact; but, with a feeling not usually shown on such occasions, he added that his was purely and essentially a defensive struggle; that he wished but to deliver his territories from the armed stranger and the invader, and that he would nowhere either violate the Russian frontiers, or seek to retaliate the aggression which he had suffered.

Admiral Nachimoff commanded the Russian fleet at Sinope, and Osman Pacha the Turkish naval detachment. This last was, in a short time, burnt and destroyed. Seven frigates, one steam frigate, two schooners, and three transports were, all except two, reduced to a shapeless heap of floating timbers, blackened with gunpowder, stained with blood, and covered with mutilated human limbs, and the corpses of 5000 brave and unfortunate Turks who, taken at fatal disadvantage, had fought to the last with unshaken heroism. In a few minutes after the action began, the outer vessels of the Turkish detachment were blown "into one long port hole." The feeble battery of Sinope, over-head, brought no succour. When its untimely guns were at length fired, some of their shot fell among the friends whom they were destined to protect. Admiral Nachimoff's squadron sustained comparatively little injury, though some of the vessels showed how strenuous had been the unavailing resistance. A few Turks swam to land, and, clamouring over the heights, escaped. Osman Pacha, before he could set fire to his own flag-ship, was taken prisoner, desperately wounded. The chief prizes which the Russians thought it still possible to remove, foundered while towed behind them in the Black Sea. Osman Pacha, whom they carried half dead to Sebastopol, expired there within six weeks from his arrival. The news of this event electrified all Europe. When it was known at St. Petersburg, the Czar distributed naval decorations, ordered a solemn "Te Deum" in the churches, and published an exulting manifesto.

WAR IN ASIA IN 1853 AND 1854.

We have alluded to the unsatisfactory vicissitudes of the war in Asia. The Turkish forces destined to operate in Anatolia, Abasia, Armenia were in a state of demoralization, which a consummate General, armed with unlimited authority, could not have at once repaired. General Guyon, our countryman, who had assumed the Ottoman name and style of Kouschid Bey, is an instructed soldier and an able man; but he was, during all this time and for long afterwards, in a subordinate position. He was compelled to witness disasters which he knew how, but which he was not permitted, to avert. The river Arpatshy forms the frontier between the Russian conquests and the Turkish possessions in Asia. In this neighbourhood the doubtful struggle reeled to and fro, with much slaughter but small results, from July to December. At the battle of Akhalzick, on the 18th of November, and, indeed, at the previous combat near Kara, one important military observation was made, and has been preserved. The Russians owed those victories in part to the weight of the metal in their field artillery. It is usual to constitute such batteries of 12-pounder guns. The Russian field-batteries, however, consisted of 16-pounder guns; and yet they were moved, mounted, and managed with all the requisite ease and rapidity. We could not interrupt the sequence of the serious events which marked a more vigorous and decisive campaign in Europe, to recount the contemporary struggles in Asia. This necessitates, both a retrospect and an anticipation; but they shall be brief. In August, Mustapha Zarif Pacha, Commander-in-Chief of the Army of Batoum, advanced from Kars, and attacked General Prince Bebutoff without success. That officer, who appears to be a man of no mean ability, assumed the offensive himself on the next day, which was the 5th of August, and defeated him, at Kurukdar, near Gumri. General Bebutoff had worsted Selim, at Bayazid, in July. Bayazid stands between the sources of the Euphrates and those of the Araxes, communicating directly with Trebizond. General Bebutoff, therefore, by this last exploit, opened the high road from Persia to Anatolia, by the south of Mount Ararat. At this time, such were the difficulties interposed by Schamyl in the Caucasus, that almost all the provisions and supplies of the Russians at Tiflis, and in advance of it, were conveyed to them by the precarious communications of the Caspian Sea; and, had a competent officer commanded the Turks in Kars, it is hard to say to what extremities the enemy might have been reduced. But, nothing could exceed Selim Pacha's unfitness for his situation. This Selim (for there are two in the war of Asia) displayed from the first not even the courage of a common soldier. But let us describe the chief combat in this Asiatic war. While Bebutoff lay in front of the main body of the Turks, some of Andronikoff's division, greatly to the Turkish right, had defeated the outposts, and were truly reported to be stealing round by the rear of that flank towards Erzeroum. General Guyon, being asked his opinion, at a Council of War summoned in haste and terror, advised an instantaneous advance, on the 4th of August, of the whole army upon Bebutoff, and then a rapid return against the column behind, near Erzeroum. By this means the Pacha could use all his force in succession against each of his divided enemies; but, by hesitation, he would soon allow them to press him, as it were, in a vice. Unfortunately, the 4th and 5th of August were esteemed unlucky days in the Turkish calendar, and the movement was delayed till the 6th. Between the Turks—who had been forced back from their former positions—and Kars, lay the enemy. Behind him rose the white towers of Gumri; and, beyond these, and on each side of them, shone the snow-crowned hills of Georgia. Thirty-five thousand Turks advanced at midnight, by the glimmer of torches, to surprise the Russian position; but treachery had preceded them, and they found that they were expected. It was a disgraceful day. Zarif Pacha lost heart and head at the first shot, and galloped about the field pale with terror himself, and terrifying his followers. Resul Pacha fled at once, on the right flank. Vely Pacha, through jealousy of Guyon, neglected to take that brave and collected



ENCAMPMENT OF THE RIFLE BRIGADE, AT CONSTANTINOPLE.—FROM A DAGUERRÉOTYPE BY J. ROBERTSON.

soldier's advice, which would have retrieved the day. The superior officers deserted their men. Half an hour after the troops were engaged, none of the Bunbashes or Murallais (the colonels and the majors) were to be seen. The mountain battery which had seized the heights, commanding the Russian right, never fired a gun—never acted at all. Major Tevey, an American, who was there, expostulated in vain. Of the forty infantry battalions, the 5th Anatolian and the 4th Desardet regiments alone resisted cavalry. One man, and one only, may be said to have behaved with real distinction—this was Tahir Pacha, in command of the Turkish Artillery, which was admirably worked from first to last. Such was the fight beyond the hills of Hadji Veleky, where 35,000 Turks were ignobly defeated by 18,000 Russians, whom they had thought to take by surprise. No reliance can be, or ought to be, placed on the conduct in the field of men who are pusillanimously, as well as unskillfully officered and led.

General Bebutoff had blown up the forts of Bayazid, as he wanted to use

the garrisons in the field: such a measure would have saved Napoleon in 1813, and Charles I. in the Great Rebellion.

We may here mention that, at the first outbreak of hostilities, the Russians had evacuated their forts in another scene of this widely-scattered conflict—we mean along the eastern shore of the Black Sea, among the Tcherkessians of Circassia. These forts protected their most direct communications through the Caucasus with the Georgian provinces.


On the 20th of August, however, General Bebutoff's combinations were disconcerted by the hero Schamyl—but for whom, indeed, Russia would, long since, have securely appropriated all the Turkish provinces on the south of the Black Sea. That indomitable man, with 20,000 Lesghian Circassians, broke into Georgia, and carried away hostages from Tiflis itself. This sort of excursion seems to be with him a regular annual operation. When most forgotten he is surest to be near. We return to Europe.

WINTER CAMPAIGN ON THE DANUBE.

On the 20th of December, the Turks who had recently struck a sharp blow at Matchin in the Northern Dobrudscha, at the extreme right of their line, were equally active and successful on its extreme left. They advanced from Kalarasch and stormed, though they meant not to keep it, the post of Karakal on the Aluta. We have explained the motives of this merely ostensible and misleading ubiquity on the part of Omer Pacha. The Turks retired from Karakal, and even from Kalarasch, but fortified themselves with unwearied assiduity in Widdin in Rahova, and in Nicopolis, on their own side of the Danube. With respect to Matchin, Omer Pacha had still less desire to retain it. He never intended to occupy the Dobrudscha during the sickly months which were impending. On the contrary, he wished the Russians to lose themselves in that fatal position, and they did. Where he could strike he struck; and, if the irritation of defeat, combined with the real facility of the occupation, should induce the enemy



ENCAMPMENT OF THE GRENADIER GUARDS, AT CONSTANTINOPLE.—FROM A DAGUERRÉOTYPE BY J. ROBERTSON.



HORSE BAZAAR, AT CONSTANTINOPLE.

to advance, it was what he wished. He fixed his own head-quarters at Rustchuk, and awaited events.

The severity of the weather, from the 22nd of December, rendered operations for some days impossible. It was the armistice of nature. About this time, Constantinople was racked with ministerial changes and political struggles. The Capudan Pacha was superseded by Halil Pacha, and some popular outbreak had seemed not improbable. The French Ambassador offered the Sultan the protection of the French fleet, but Abdul Medjid replied magnanimously that "he would rather abdicate than accept foreign assistance against his own people." On Christmas-day, the Allied squadrons were still in Beicos Bay; and, though more decisive counsels were known to have animated (since the catastrophe of Sinope), the counsels of the Maritime Powers, the state of the Black Sea delayed till the 4th of January the entrance of the

fleets. The Union Jack and the Eagle were still reflected in the waters of the Bosphorus from the masts of a mighty but inactive armada.

The Russians had sustained many checks in the field. The spell of their arms was departing. But they announced how inadequate their preparations had been, how every day their position was strengthened, and in what irresistible force they would soon establish themselves throughout the scene of action. Two hundred thousand soldiers were to be poured into the Principalities, and were in fact fast arriving at their destination, in spite of the horrors of long winter marches through a thousand obstacles.

Osten Sacken's corps was marked and proclaimed with formidable regularity in all the stages of its approach. A sublime diary diversified the journals of Europe, describing the nearer and nearer progress of those invincible legions through ice and snow and storm, and amidst

difficulties hardly to be conceived. For weeks the attention of the world tracked in suspense the awful advance. The troops, meantime, which were already in Wallachia, spread themselves (with very poor strategy, in our humble opinion, not to speak of the impolicy of the demonstration) along the *Austrian* frontier, from Orsova nearly to Kronstadt, in Transylvania. Any one who but glances at a map will see the uselessness, the waste of men, the insanity of this disposition. Not such the conduct of Omer Pacha. Ever warily withdrawing, in reality, his right wing, he abandoned northern Dobrudscha, and fixed upon Trajan's Wall as the limits of his first stand in that direction. This memorable barrier against the cognate barbarians of ancient times, extends, eastwards, from a little below Czernavoda, on the Danube, to Kustendjeh, on the coast. Just about that point, the Danube, which has been flowing from east to west, tak-



BRITISH INFANTRY IN BARRACKS, AT GALLIPOLI.

a bend at right angles to the north, and encloses the Dobruška between its waters and the sea. At Galatz, some eighty miles further, it resumes, at another right angle, its former eastward course, and thus furnishes the western and northern boundaries of that vast morass called the Dobruška, of which the Euxine and Trajan's Wall, respectively, form the eastern and southern limitation. Behind Trajan's Wall Omer Pacha stationed a force sufficient to impose quarantine upon the advancing and pestilence-bearing invaders. It was a front of twenty miles to defend, or less; for it was not passable or practicable for more than two-thirds of its extent; and this was under thirty miles. It was General Lüders who was to conduct the invasion on this side.

The Russians, having raised intrenchments at Bucharest, began a serious triple advance. One corps, 22,000 strong, was to attack Kalafat; a second was to occupy Karakal; and the third was to move down the Aluta towards Turna. With these operations (and the withdrawal of the Russian fleet into Sebastopol) ended the year 1853. And in the opening days of the next year (though on the "Old Christmas-day" of '53, according to the Russian style, which still reckons by the Julian Calendar), one of the most brilliant feats of arms in modern Turkish history astonished the world, and proved what vigour still was left in the sick man.

BATTLE OF CITATE.

Of the three Russian corps, whose orders to execute a simultaneous advance we have mentioned, the westernmost was that which was ready to enter first into action. "The Pagans," stationed at Kalafat, were those whom it was the special business of this column "to annihilate." It was commanded by General Fishback, under whom acted Generals Engelhardt and Bellegarde; while Prince Vassilitchko led the cavalry. Their whole corps consisted of but 22,000 men, of whom 7000 moved more slowly to act as a reserve, loitering near Karaul, on the left of the line of march. The operations, in our humble opinion, continue still to evince the incapacity of the Russian Generals. There was a neighbouring column, only a few miles to the left, as strong as their own. Had both been rapidly united, and flung together either upon Kalarasch, and so across to Rahova, or hurled in combination against Kalafat, resistance would have been clearly impossible. But they moved in parallel lines, each with a different, each its own distinct, destination. But, doubtless, the operation which we have hinted, and which would have been very easy to French troops, and even to our own, required great celerity of movement. Otherwise, the dispersed Osmanlis would themselves have had time to make a corresponding concentration. Now in celerity of movement, the Russians are not only inferior to the French (whose forces in this excel all other modern nations, and indeed excel all the regular armies that ever existed), but inferior even to the Turks, and strikingly inferior to them. For commissariat reasons (and several others), it is extremely inconvenient and unavoidable to concentrate a very large body of men except *just before fighting*; and the time allowed by this last expression ought not to be longer for an army of fifty, or even seventy thousand men (previously distributed at proper strategic points, or, in other words, well led), than twenty-four hours. All great generals have recognised this principle, and have tried so to arrange that they could, in the presence of the enemy, reduce it to practice. But what the French habitually do in twenty-four hours, the Russians, during this war, have frequently taken six and even fourteen days to accomplish. Let us attend General Fishback in his present proceedings. Not being joined by the column on his left, nor by any of the idle garrisons to the rear of his right, and having disposed of seven thousand of his own men as a reserve, he found, when he arrived at Citate, that he had with him only fifteen thousand. Now, the Turks at Kalafat, whom he was going to attack, were intrenched; and no soldiers defend intrenchments better. Moreover, their force was numerically equal to his own; and, finally, they were in immediate communication with Widdin, across the Danube, and probably from Widdin would be largely supported. He began to doubt whether he was strong enough for his undertaking; the only wonder is that he had not entertained this doubt a week earlier. Accordingly, this intending assailant suddenly halted at Citate, and began to throw up intrenchments, not between the village and the Turks, but behind the village. In this deliberate manner he was occupied during the 4th and 5th of January, new style, and the assault upon Kalafat was postponed to the 13th, the Russian New-year's Day. Fishback would open the Julian year brilliantly; large reinforcements were demanded; the inactive columns on his right were summoned to join him from Radowa, Orsova, and the Transylvanian frontier; and then a grand combined onslaught would drive the Turks into the Danube, or at the worst compel them to cross it, and seek refuge in Widdin. These proceedings clearly prove the justice of our criticism on the original plan,—which they stultify. A strategy which is always correcting itself, must be bad; nor is even, in general, the correction good; for a wise measure, in war, is a wise measure only at the precise moment for it. Next day it is often as foolish as the blunder which it is meant to repair. The Russian Generals are always busy each week with the measures which belong to the preceding week, for it is only a week afterwards that they discover what ought to have been done a week before; and then, with equal folly, they do it, though it has become in its turn as unsuitable as their former measures. They are aware of an opening when they see the enemy cover it; and though it is no longer an opening (for the ward of the fencer is up), they thrust. On the other hand, they are themselves exposed; they know it not, but they suddenly feel the point, and then they parry in that guard to avert a lunge which is not coming—it has come already, and pierced home. Can these men be called Generals?

The Pachas, Achmet and Ismail, who commanded at Kalafat, were informed of all General Fishback's movements, and well knew that the intended attack of the 13th of January would be very serious. Resolute leaders of resolute troops, they yet looked forward with anxiety to an encounter with forty-five thousand Russians, exactly three times the number of their own force. They determined not to await the leisure of the Russians, or the ultimate danger of such an assault, but to sally forth at once, and to fight General Fishback at Citate, on more equal terms. At daybreak therefore, on the 6th of January (Christmas-day in Russia), they marched from Kalafat. They had fifteen field guns, ten thousand regular infantry, whom Ismail and Achmet Pachas themselves led in person; four thousand cavalry, commanded by Mustapha Bey; and a thousand Bashi-bozouks, under the colonelcy of the gallant and adventurous Skender-Beg, of historic name. The road to Citate led through Roman, Galantza, Funtina, and Moglovitz. To prevent any surprise of Kalafat in their absence, Ismail had ordered over 3000 of the garrison of Widdin, as a temporary guard. He took the further precaution of leaving about an equal number of troops at Moglovitz, on the road, in order to maintain his communications, and at need, protect his retreat, if he was beaten. By their help he would, at the worst, rally his force at Moglovitz. It was nine o'clock the assailants entered Citate, in the streets of which were posted 3000 Russians and four guns. By a cross street, the Turks brought some of their own pieces to play upon the defenders, and then Achmet engaged them in front with his infantry. After the first onset, the Turks

disdained the restraints of rank and file—restraints not suited to street-fighting. The battle resembled a meeting of innumerable pairs of duellists; and for this species of close and personal action the Turks had the advantage in arms, in bodily vigour, and in courage. The Russian soldier possessed now no weapon but his bayonet, and was cumbrously accoutred. The agile Turk had the bayonet also, and if, in the crush, or the turns of the dense and wild struggle, a blade and its shorter thrust, or its cut, were more desirable, he instantly had the ready and national weapon in his hands. From house to house—storming every place out of the window of which a shot had been fired—from crossing to crossing—indoors and out of doors—the assailants pressed back the Russians; and, in three hours, had driven them into their intrenchments. Against these the Turks forthwith brought up their field-pieces, which, we believe, were as many as fifteen; and here they suffered their principal loss that day. The cannonade was briskly sustained on both sides, and several bold assaults upon the works were repulsed. In the midst of this conflict, the Russian reinforcements from Karaul appeared. Had they arrived while the Turks were entering the village, they would, perhaps, have finished the action almost as soon as it had been begun. But now the position taken by those who were beleaguering the Russian trenches, and a part of whom faced about to meet the new enemy, must be reached through some suburban orchards and gardens; and as the reserves ventured upon these, they were used as a natural intrenchment by the Turks—with this difference, that the defenders were prompt to sally from them. It was a curious position; the Turks were, at the same moment, assailants in front, and on their defence in the rear; and, while their original attack was repulsed, they were victorious over the attack against themselves. The hedges, the walls, every tree, every bush, served them as so many fortresses. Meantime Ismail Pacha, when he had driven the Russians out of the streets of Citate, had recollected the force he had left at Moglovitz, and bethought him with what object. His circumstances were now altered. He no longer contended for safety; he contended for victory; and he wanted to make victory as complete as possible; he therefore sent for these reserves. They arrived, just as the Russian column from Karaul had been entirely repulsed, with the loss of 250 men, and were dispersing in a disorderly flight, pursued by a sufficient body of horse to prevent them from rallying. The Turkish ranks were now re-formed; and, with new vigour, and augmented numbers, they returned to the assault of the intrenchment, out of which the Russians had never been able successfully to sally. This last effort was triumphant. The Turks burst through the defences, and routed the disheartened troops behind them. About 2400 Russians were slain in the village, among the gardens, and in the field works. A proportionate number were wounded, and, amongst these, two Generals, who are stated to have been Aurep and Tuinont. We believe that the Turks took not a dozen prisoners—so ferocious was the engagement. They, on their side, had 200 men killed, and 700 wounded. They captured four guns, and all the ammunition and stores in the intrenchments; besides, of course, obtaining the arms of the slain. The village of Citate remained in their hands; and on the next day, and the next again, they held it by force against the vehement efforts of the enemy to retake it. They ranged about the neighbourhood as masters for a few days longer, and, by several brilliant raids and forays, drove the Russians all the way back to Krajova. This division of the invading army now established its head-quarters at Slatina—a more distant and more modest situation than they had recently intended to select; and Europe thenceforward heard no more of the great deed appointed for the 13th of January, viz., the storming of Kalafat. All the Russian combinations were, in fact, arrested and dislocated by this prompt, this brilliant, rush of the Turks upon Citate—a dictate of genius. They saved their post, in the only way in which it could have been saved—by assailing that of the enemy. Such was the remarkable combat of Citate—an action which proves that the Turks know how to attack and to storm intrenchments, as well as how to defend them. We have been the more minute in our account of this event, because some people, at this time, called it "a waste of bravery." No deep insight into the mysteries of strategy is needed to perceive that this exploit, on the contrary, displayed the greatest prudence, that it economised the Turkish means and chances, dispersed and disordered the plans of the invader, and tended powerfully to render his final discomfiture more practicable and more certain. After a short time, still guided by the same steady and circumspect moderation, the Turks retired to their intrenchments at Kalafat, where they had by this time mounted 250 heavy guns. There, and at Widdin, immediately behind it, on the other side of the Danube, they had increased their force to 25,000 men.

SUBSEQUENT OPERATIONS; AND THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE EUROPEAN POWERS.

On the day before the battle of Citate (the 5th), Omer Pacha had again alarmed the Russians at Giurgevo, where there was a sharp skirmish, in which the Turks had rather the advantage. They then recrossed the river. Omer was teaching them to forget 1829—to know their own prowess, and to place a due confidence in him, and in themselves.

Still, it is not to be denied that the Russians were very far indeed from having any reason to dread being expelled from the Principalities by Omer Pacha. He skillfully led forces who gallantly served him. But that is all. His means were inadequate to recover Wallachia; and barely able, if ably used, to protect the Empire. He could not really assume the offensive; and he scarcely succeeded, by the exercise of very great ability, in pretending to assume it. The Russians were incessantly reinforced. Their siege-trains had begun to arrive, and they had parked a hundred and twenty large guns at Galatz, opposite the Bessarabian frontier, and a hundred at Giurgevo.

In the Crimea, the Czar, prescient of coming dangers, had ordered the erection of coast batteries, which were now rising in every favourable spot upon the cliffs. At such a time, and after such occurrences, the order reached our fleet to salute the Russian ships. There was a better use, than that, for our guns. At Constantinople, news arrived that Kars was taken, and that, on the other hand, all Abasia had pronounced for Schamyl, and that a great attack upon Sheketil had been repulsed. The Allied squadrons patrolled the Euxine; there was no danger of another Sinope; and Turkish reinforcements, therefore, were dispatched by sea to Armenia. In the following March, the Sultan, it was announced, would join the army of Bulgaria; and great and truly Asiatic preparations resounded in Adrianople to entertain him when he should pass. A palace was newly equipped in that ancient city, where eight hundred domestics and five hundred horses, belonging to Abdul-Medjid, had already arrived. Less depressing intelligence was brought from Akhalkzik, and against Gumri.

On the 19th of January, Lieutenant-General Schilders, who, in 1829, had taken Silistria, and who was at the head of the engineering department in the Russian army, left Warsaw, in pursuance of a command of the Emperor Nicholas, and, on the 26th, reached Krajova, to assume the supreme direction of the siege operations of the ensuing campaign. Omer Pacha had then been ill for three weeks, in fact, since the date of the last combat at Giurgevo, and he was reported to

be dying. About the 14th of the month the news reached the Sultan and on the 20th, or the 21st, two of his own household physicians were in attendance upon the able warrior who had retrieved the fortunes and restored the fame of the Osmanlis. This was at Schumla whither he had retired. In ten days more he was again well, and he resumed his duties. General (now Marshal) Baraguay D'Hilliers, the French Ambassador, a good diplomatist, but a better soldier—the last surviving pupil of Napoleon, made—about this time, that tour of inspection for which he was so well qualified; and we will note, in passing, that, at the same date, the Russo-Greek conspiracy broke out. Europe was alarmed more by what could not then be known than by what was ascertained; and when Arta was seized, some people supposed that the Ottoman Empire, filled with explosive materials, was now at its end, and that it would be at once burnt out in a huge civil conflagration. The limits of the insurrection, however, were soon as well known as its nature and its origin.

General Schilders made his first report before the end of January—it was not the loose and cursory conjecture of a hostile witness, but the official return of an experienced Russian General to his Sovereign, respecting the losses of a Russian army. We cannot read it without a shudder. He states that, in January, 1853, *thirty-five thousand Russian soldiers* had already perished in the Principalities. This is not only a Russian statement, we repeat, but the statement of one of the ablest and most distinguished Generals in the service of the Czar. And yet, at that date, there had been only two months, or, at most, ten weeks of actual fighting; nor was it, in truth, chiefly by the sword that this stupendous loss had been inflicted. Fatigue, hunger, want, cold, the marsh fever, and the cholera, had swept away five-sixths of these wretched victims to the military ambition of one bad man.

For about a month, dating from the battle of Citate, both armies on the Danube were occupied chiefly in preparations for fighting; and it is fortunate that the illness of Omer Pacha—which lasted three weeks—occurred after such exploits as secured his troops for a while from the chance of any serious molestation. But, further, he had made already his principal arrangements; and his part now was to wait. During this lull in the war, Count Orloff was endeavouring, at Vienna and Berlin, to detach the two great German Courts from England and France, and to induce them to espouse the cause of the Emperor Nicholas. What were exactly the offers which Count Orloff was instructed to make, or by the proposal of what iniquitous equivalents he hoped to succeed, we are not able to say. One day, doubtless, the details of that secret negotiation, like those of many in former times, will be made public. Of the minor German Courts, and of the degree to which they were swayed by the feelings of marriage, kindred, or by the spell of his political influence, the Czar was sure. But on Denmark and Sweden he was very anxious to make an immediate impression. These two States, backed by his own maritime power—with their coast batteries, island-fortresses, and fleets—skilled in the marine topography of the shallow, winding, and entangled waters which form the entrance to the Baltic,—those Powers, thus defended and armed with all the peculiar vessels that suit the scene, might have offered, in the ensuing spring, a formidable barrier to a hostile expedition. The Czar, however, made no progress in the favour or the fears of the two Scandinavian Monarchies—the janitors of his northern dominions; and, in his rage, he at length sent to King Oscar what we may call "a last word, which amounted to this, 'Look, then, well to your own interests.' We think he has looked to them well, and would have looked to them even better, if, instead of refusing to act with Russia, he had resolved to act against her.

The reader perceives how vast were the necessary dimensions of a war with Russia. Our brave countrymen would have to fight, at the moment, in scenes which were thousands of miles asunder, yet everywhere against the same enemy. Comrades, well known to each other were to help in a common work, while one part of them were in the frozen north, and the other amid the pestilential heats of Bulgaria, and off the rose-fields and vineyards of the Crimean coast, with all the continent between. Nor was the large battle-space which Europe afforded, sufficient for such a conflict. It was to rage in Asia, and to threaten even a part of North America, Russian America, with its presence. Its range embraces—we do not say many very different countries merely—but even many distinct and dissimilar climates—those vaster territories and divisions of nature herself.

It was on the 8th of February that, at length, Baron Brunnow, the Ambassador of the Emperor Nicholas at the Court of St. James, took his reluctant and memorable departure from London. M. Kisselef, at the same moment, said the same significant farewell at Paris, to our powerful and faithful Ally, Napoleon the Third. Thus England and France, confederates for the first time in a great military struggle, were left face to face with the most important war which had occurred for many centuries, and, beyond comparison, the most awful (in the means of destruction) ever known since the foundation of the world. Count Orloff's mission having failed to preserve peace, war became the only road to its restoration; and in the hope that that war might be short, all good men wished it should be vigorous. Still the Allies were unwilling to make the rupture irrevocable. They framed a statement of the terms on which they could yet treat with Russia, and, having obtained the assent of Austria to the principles of their proposal, sent it to St. Petersburg. They then redoubled their preparations for the conflict. The Baltic fleet was fitted out, and Sir Charles Napier selected for its command. The French contributed their contingent to this fleet; but, while in the Black Sea, they maintained a magnificent naval force and even a greater number of first-class ships than we ourselves, their proportion of the Baltic fleet was considerably smaller. Therefore, Admiral Parseval De-chènes here gave precedence to Admiral Napier, just as Lord Raglan, in the united army of the East, yielded the highest post to the Maréchal de St. Arnaud, who brought a larger force into the field. It was agreed that the expedition of the Western Powers to Turkey should, in the first instance, consist of about seventy-five thousand men, of whom the French should furnish about fifty or forty-five thousand, and the English rather more than half that number. But the Emperor Napoleon openly announced that, in case of necessity, he could spare, and would send, a hundred thousand troops to that particular scene of conflict; that he would maintain, in addition, a great army in camp and ready for the march, on the northern frontier of France; and that this host he would, if compelled, lead in person to a part of Europe where no operations were originally contemplated, and where, he hoped, there would be no occasion finally to act—a part of Europe where he should regret to renew the memorable lessons of 1806 and 1807. Nor was this all: besides the splendid army which he would at once dispatch to Turkey; besides the mighty fleet which would act in the East conjointly with ours, besides the camp at Toulon, in the south of France, and the military centres to be formed at Brest and Lorient in the north; besides the vast, effective, and independent army, which would be soon collected in the Pas de Calais; besides the second, and necessarily smaller, fleet of twenty-five ships of war, which were to support and share our own Baltic expedition—he determined further to send—what would be very much needed in the latter seas, but what

England could not sufficiently soon supply—or, indeed, well spare at all—a strong body of land troops to operate in connection with the naval force. All these engagements he fulfilled—and so fulfilled that, in every instance, his deeds outstripped his words. Such facts convey a splendid, indeed, but a just idea of the resources and the vitality of France, and show (when we consider the commercial troubles and civil dissensions which lately racked and enfeebled that noble country) how much may be accomplished, and in how very short a time, by the wisdom, the public spirit, the undaunted and unrelaxing energy, the high trust highly fulfilled, of a great man at the head of a great nation. We must remember, moreover, that all these efforts, prodigious as they were, by no means laid upon the powerful and gallant people, now joined with us in a hearty brotherhood of arms, a load too heavy for their strength; but were accompanied by a public prosperity long unknown, and never known to the same degree—a prosperity not interrupted by these measures, and still, in truth, daily and hourly increasing. Yet all this is but little; nor could we adequately describe the magnificent place which the empire of our confederate occupies in the destinies of the Continent, without taking into the picture many particulars foreign from our present task. The feats of power mentioned, which would seem, in their magnitude, to have resulted from the efforts of many nations, not of one, have in no respect interfered with the general service of France. They have not altered the posture of her domestic authority; they have not diverted the action of her foreign influence; they have not even disturbed her outlying garrisons of occupation or protection. One French force effectually guards from violence the nascent arts and rising commerce of Algeria, along hundreds of leagues of an important coast; another, in the capital of Italy, reminds the wavering Councils of Vienna that Russia is not the only Power which has access to the dominions of the House of Hapsburg, or at whose call, and under whose banners, oppressed nations might shake off the sway of that House, and make an end of its empire.

Early in February, on the other hand, our own military arrangements were far advanced. The Militia had, in great part, been actually levied, and were fast acquiring that discipline which alone they wanted, to render them a perfectly sufficient defence of the country in the absence of our soldiers. On the 22nd of the month, the first British detachment, destined for the East, the Coldstream and Grenadier Guards, left London by railway, for Southampton, and there embarked amidst the acclamations of an immense multitude, who had flocked from neighbouring, and even from distant counties, to bid good speed to their defenders. After this date regiment followed regiment in quick succession. The cavalry went last; and the horses were so long delayed, that loud complaints arose on the part of the public, who, in their impatience, could not understand the great difficulties attending the enterprise. A part of the provisions, and especially one shipment of provender, were in a state which proved that some base contractors could seek a fraudulent profit, at the cost of a great, a momentous enterprise, upon which were bent the just solicitude, and yet the highest hopes, of millions; and that men lived who could be content to swindle a few pounds, though the unhallowed gain must diminish the efficiency of a national expedition, and perhaps waste the lives, or tend ingloriously to spill the blood, which our soldiers had devoted to the interest, the service, and the honour of our common country. All this time the French were also in full activity. Great forces of cavalry and infantry and field-guns were directed towards the south; and, passing through Lyons and Grenoble, reached the sea-ports of the Mediterranean. There, a sufficient fleet was fast assembling for their transport; and they were rapidly embarked at Marseilles and Toulon. The heavier artillery required for siege operations was not so soon prepared. Even with us this was destined to be the last munition furnished; but, late as we were in sending that material, it is, nevertheless, the only particular in which we outstripped the celerity of our emulous Allies.

DESULTORY CONFLICT ON THE DANUBE.

Such were the occurrences in the West while the long-suffering world awaited the answer of Nicholas to the last offers of the Western Powers, sent through the hands of Austria. It was wisely agreed to prepare for war, though it was modestly determined to defer declaring it until the superb Autocrat should, by his next message, in whatever sense, deliver the nations from further uncertainty. The news that the Russian Envoys had quitted London and Paris reached Constantinople in about twelve days (that is, on the 20th of February, 1854), and excited the wildest joy. The delight of the Osmanlis overcame their habitual gravity. The ancient capital of the East broke into a frenzy of exultation. Intelligence of the great event was dispatched to the army of the Danube; but, before the messengers arrived, that army already knew it from the wild Syrian recruits and the Bashi-bozouks of Asia, who tried the mettle of their Arabian coursers in a race against the Government couriers, which should be the first to report the awful and final rupture between the Giaours of the East and the Giaours of the West. Hostilities had been actively resumed. After their late repulses and humiliations at Matchin, at Giurgevo, and at Citate, the Russians, as though retreat were their next business, began to fortify Foksani, a place far to the rear, seated at the foot of the Carpathians, and about half-way between Bucharest, the chief town of Wallachia, and Jassy, the distant capital of Moldavia. In Foksani they laid up large military stores; and then, finding that there was no advance of the Turks, and that their own reinforcements were constantly, if slowly, arriving, they resumed the offensive.

About the 13th of February they collected a considerable strength against Giurgevo, and attacked it, with much loss indeed, but, in this sense, with success, that the Turks, after two or three days' resistance, evacuated the place in perfect order, and took boat to Rustchuk. This was on the 19th of February. The enemy immediately seized the town. Guns were then directed against Rustchuk. Day and night the Russians sought, by force and by guile, to cross at that point. The resistance was desperate. Nevertheless, by the increasing weight of the pressure, Omer Pacha felt that the enemy in some place must attain the right bank of the Danube. The melancholy certainty justified his original plan and dispositions. He took an extraordinary resolution, however, which was in some respects a change (unless it was a corollary) of that plan. He determined not to recall his outlying and far-extended left wing; but, in case of any intermediate advance and irruption of the enemy, to leave it to act like an independent army, and to give it a roving commission—predatory, adventurous, dangerous—on the right flank of the whole Russian occupation. It should have its base upon Servia, and, in case of mishap, its retreat upon Bosnia. Semendria on the north, Ustizza on the south, Zvornok straight behind, in the west, should be to its rear, what Schumla was to have been. Schumla, he hoped, would take care of itself, and he of Schumla. Perhaps the noble combat of Citate inclined his doubtful thoughts to this decision. The consequences of that victory were long felt; and on the 24th of February the Russians were still on their defence, and rather timidly commanded, in front of Kalafat—a town which accord-

ing to their own plans, ought to have been stormed on the 13th of the previous month.

March opened with a change. The Russians had completed their dilatory preparations; and they now had, for attack, all the means which they were likely to have. Still, on the very eve of their grand and irresistible advance into Bulgaria, Wallachia was the scene of another warning blow. The Turkish column at Rahova crossed the Danube on the 4th of March, and drove back the Russian outposts of Kalarasch with perfect success, and no small slaughter. Then, while the whole force of the enemy was assembling to punish this inroad, the Turks returned in safety to Rahova. On the 5th of March martial law was proclaimed through all the Russias and in Poland; and orders came to the Russian Generals in the Principalities to press the war more vigorously. On the 11th of the same month there was a violent struggle around Kalafat; but the Turks remained masters of the place. It was their last stronghold on the northern bank of the Danube. But they continued to keep the south bank, as well as some islands in the stream. That island, especially, opposite Turtukai (the Turkish batteries on which helped to gain the Battle of Oltenitza), will be remembered by the reader. Prince Gortschakoff attacked it on the 15th March, and would have gained it very dearly at the cost of 2000 men; for that island, as we have shown, was as much commanded from the south shore as it commanded the north. But Prince Gortschakoff lost 2000 men in this attack, and, at the same time, failed to take the island. It would have been a victory of very uncertain value; but it was a bloody defeat instead. About this time, between the 12th and 16th, two frigates, one English and one French, were dispatched from Beicos Bay, to open by force the Sulineh Mouth (which is the middle mouth) of the Danube. It may seem to posterity wonderful that Beicos should still have been the station from which to summon even any of the Allied vessels. But many untoward circumstances—some natural, and others, perhaps, conventional and deceptive—the delays of diplomacy, and the dreadful storms which had so long swept the Black Sea—combined to render it as advisable in appearance, as it was fortunate in results, that the fleets should return frequently to their old moorings.

MEASURES TAKEN BY ENGLAND AND FRANCE.

On the 12th of March, 1854, the Emperor Nicholas vouchsafed to the terms proposed by the Western Powers this memorable reply, "*that those terms required not five minutes' consideration.*" He, in fact, rejected them with contempt; and announced to his own Ministers and great officers that, before he submitted to such conditions, he would sacrifice his last soldier, and spend his last rouble. While this haughty decision—the general purport of which the electric wires sent flashing at once through all Europe—was borne to London and Paris by the overland couriers, the French and English troops began, though very gradually, to muster in force at Gallipoli. It was a considerable time before they had assembled on the little peninsula to the west of the Dardanelles about 14,000 French and about 7,000 English troops. The French had a shorter voyage to make; but then they had more soldiers, more materials of war, and more provisions, to transport. They arrived the first; and they disembarked and encamped with greater ease, promptitude, and order, than our soldiers. They had, moreover, come so much better furnished, that, in several instances, after their own debarkation, they helped, and greatly expedited, with the boats of their men-of-war, the landing of a much smaller body of English troops. Once on shore, the same almost imp-like agility of our gallant friends—their tact, readiness, self-possessed assurance, and good-humoured audacity, gave them still the advantage. The services which we could scarcely induce the Turks to render, after days, and sometimes weeks, of discussion, the French very cleverly, and very properly, extorted on the spot. They were, moreover, accompanied by the whole of their tools; while at least a portion of ours was sent by a different conveyance from that of its owners. The French camp speedily resembled a colonial settlement; while Gallipoli and all the neighbourhood were Gallicised as if by magic, both in name and in deed. "Office of the French Quartermaster-General," "Office of the French Commissary-General," "French Hospital," "Yousouf-street," "Street of the Posts and Mails," "French Light Infantry-street," "Head-quarters-street," "General Engineer Office-street," "Army Police-office Quarter"—such, or similar and equivalent designations, couched in the French language, and inscribed on conspicuous sign-boards, routed away and replaced the old Mahometan styles and indications, and introduced European method, and a luminous, simple, and convenient clue into the intricate obscurity of the place. French names were established everywhere; and, what is more instructive, *French prices*. A market tariff for every article of necessity was immediately fixed, and it was rigidly enforced. It was impossible not to be struck, at every step, by the characteristic proceedings of our vivid-minded and active allies; by their adaptability to circumstances—their resolute and instantaneous effort to master these—their great faculty of acting together without confusion,—and their really wonderful idea of military self-administration. The rapid measures we have enumerated are merely a part of those which both amused and instructed our own troops, down to the very privates. For instance, the landing had hardly been forty-eight hours effected when, not only all that we have detailed was accomplished, but a perfect system of French police was in as full action among themselves (and occasionally among the Turks) as if they had been in Marseilles or Algiers; and, at the same time, it was stated that our regimental surgeons had to borrow what they at first happened to want from the medicine-chests of these alert confederates; though we are bound to add that, if this necessity existed, it lasted but for a very few days.

That so close an association, and so intimate an intercourse between the armies of the two great Powers of the West were certain to lead to much enlightenment on both sides, anybody can see. There are many points in which we excel those gallant troops; and they have studied us with attention, and doubtless not without profit. On our parts, perchance, there was also something to learn. But, independently of this reciprocal advantage, and far above it in value, is the amity which has thus been established. This expedition has been a greater destroyer of prejudices than centuries of passive friendliness in less contiguous intercourse could possibly have been. The two nations have literally shaken hands and embraced; and their love is on both sides the warmer for former conflicts, in which they witnessed each in his antagonist personal qualities of heroic valour and boundless generosity, which have excited a reciprocal and eternal admiration—a reciprocal and indestructible esteem. It was their warriors who represented the two countries in the quarrels of other days; and it is their warriors who now represent them in their enthusiastic and profound reconciliation. The chiefs and officers of the English expedition had, in Paris, met the chiefs and officers of the French expedition, and had been received with transports of joy, and the most prodigal hospitality; the common soldiers, and the common sailors also, wherever their ships approached each other on their way to a mutual war against the enemy of both, testified their feelings, and exchanged a cordial greeting, in rapturous cheers and shouts, which awoke to their martial noise the echoes of many a strange and classic shore. And, at last, when, on the strand of Gallipoli, they

met to conquer or to die, side by side—to share their hardships, their battles, and their glory together—the French and English troops—sailors and soldiers alike—almost threw themselves into each other's arms. Indeed, their reciprocal good-will was often testified in a ludicrous manner; nor was it always strictly observant of the proper bounds of discipline. The poor fellows, not content with contriving, out of the little they possessed, to exchange presents, would sometimes, when these failed, exchange, in moments which were only too convivial, their very dresses; and, one morning at parade, a French Colonel of Zouaves was exceedingly perplexed to see among his men a soldier, whose corps he knew not; but who resembled, he thought, by his cap and feather, a Highlander of the British army. At precisely the same moment, the Colonel of the Highland regiment was astonished to behold on one of his gallant men the yellow leggings and some of the other accoutrements of the Zouaves. The respective commanding officers soon found that the apparent Highlander spoke French, and the apparent Frenchman English. In their fraternal computations the night before, each soldier, vexed that he could not speak a word that was understood by his comrade, had resorted to this extraordinary method of demonstrating their sentiments.

This incident in itself, doubtless, is trivial; but, historically, nothing ought to be considered trivial which both illustrates and proves far more authentically than could whole pages of dissertation—and, of course, with much livelier effect—some vast revolution of national sentiment, or the passions prevailing at a great crisis, and not slightly influencing great events. At home, the popularity of the war and the public enthusiasm in its favour, were sometimes illustrated by incidents quite as amusing as those which marked the brotherly cordiality subsisting between the French and English soldiers at Gallipoli. The remembrance of our readers will bear us out in this observation; but we will put one little occurrence of the kind on record. A gallant private, under orders for the war, spent his last night in a farewell feast with some dear friends, who induced him to drink more than was advisable. He parted from them so late that he had to march fast if he would re-enter his barracks in time, and he thought he could give himself fresh strength and add wings to his speed, if, near London, bridge, he took a pint of porter on the way. Entering a public-house he demanded this refreshment, placing the price on the counter. The publican saw that he had already drunk too much, and refused to serve him; whereupon the soldier seized a pint belonging to some one else, and, holding the owner away at arm's length, drank it, saying that this was "Roossian treatment," and that he would have his money's worth by force, if not by favour. A scuffle ensued, the gallant soldier slept that night in a police-cell; next morning he was brought before a magistrate, and fined five shillings. He declared he had not such a sum in the whole world. He was told he must go to prison till it was forthcoming. But he simply rejoined, looking round the court, that he was under immediate orders for the East—a fact confirmed by his sergeant, who, besides, praised the man's general character. Immediately, a good-humoured contest arose among the spectators, who should be the first to pay the fine. The soldier, with many thanks to his deliverers, "whom he did not know," said they might rely upon his doing his humble duty; and he hoped that, with the help of his comrades, he should "thrash the Russians." Our readers will pardon these short anecdotes, for the sake of what they serve to commemorate so graphically.

In France, the same feelings everywhere prevailed; and the unanimity of the people strengthened and expedited the measures of the Government. The recruits for the new "conscription" came, of their own accord, to be enrolled; and the public sentiments were even more strikingly evinced, in connection with perhaps the most wonderful and original of the many wonderful and original measures of State by which Napoleon III. has signalled his reign. We allude to the French Loan, issued to the community at large, on the 10th of March, 1854. He addressed himself not to speculators, bankers, and capitalists, but to his people themselves. He was convinced he could thus obtain a larger sum, raise it in a shorter time, and receive it on better terms for the State; but, above all, he saw an opportunity of forwarding, by this bold appeal, one of his most cherished designs. He would give to France what England long possessed, a new class directly interested in the general stability: he would have thousands of public fund-holders all over the country; and when he had thus led his people to yield hostages to order, he would have made one step more towards the accomplishment of his great mission, "the mission (we quote his own words) of closing for ever the era of revolutions in his native land."

In a single week 310,000,000 francs were subscribed to this novel loan, and in an extraordinarily short time, it was all at the disposal of the French Government.

It was in the same week, on the 11th March, that our Baltic Fleet sailed from Spithead, in the presence of the Queen, who led it out to sea in her yacht, the *Fairy*, offering the most heart-stirring spectacle, which the present generation had ever beheld. The *Royal George* moved the first, followed rapidly by the *St. Jean d'Acre* and *Tribune*, under single-reefed topsails. Then in quick succession, obeying the signal "to weigh" of the Admiral—who stood, glass in hand, on the quarter-deck of the *Duke of Wellington*—came the *Impérieuse*, *Blenheim*, *Amphion*, *Princess Royal*, *Edinburgh*, *Ajax*, *Arrogant*, and *Hogue*. The paddle-ships, *Leopard*, *Valorous*, and *Dragon*, were the next; and these completed the first division of England's Baltic Fleet. The Admiral himself led it, or rather followed it, in that stupendous floating fortress of 131 guns of the largest calibre, the *Duke of Wellington*, which throws a ton of metal at every broadside, to a distance unparalleled by any batteries on land or sea. Another great division was preparing to follow this noble fleet of sixteen war-steamers, and three carrying a 'miral's' flag: Admiral Chads, in the *Edinburgh*, and Admiral Plumrie in the *Leopard*, acting under Sir Charles Napier. Of these sixteen war-steamers, all but four were built on the screw principle. The only fault to be found with the fleet, is that it was too fine, and that the vessels were too large and mazy, and of a draught too deep for the seas in which they were to act. About the time of these operations of the allies in widely separated seas, the sympathies manifested towards Russia by a large part of the population in the kingdom of Greece, began to excite uneasiness and indignation. Indeed, it was found necessary, not very long afterwards to drop, while on their way to a worthier scene of action, a portion of the French contingents; and some six thousand of these troops landed accordingly near Athens, in order to bring a petty but troublesome kingdom to its senses. They landed the greater part of that number at the Piræus on the 15th of May. We mention this to save or abridge future digression from the more important events which will occupy the reader's notice. It was on the 27th of March that the formal rupture between Turkey and Greece occurred. The Greek Envoy, General Metaxas, receiving, on that day, his passports at Constantinople. The Sultan had sent whatever troops he could spare to the frontier of Thessaly, under Achmet Pacha, to oppose the inroads of the Greeks who were endeavouring to organise a general insurrection of their co-religionists all over the Turkish Empire;



"VICTORIA" (CAPTAIN LACY). 23RD AND
PART OF 7TH FUSILIERS.

23RD FUSILIERS
EMBARKING.

DRAGOON CAMP.


TURKISH PRIZE.

ENGLISH
TRANSPORTS.

"TRENT"
EMBARKING CAVALRY.

ENGLISH
TRANSPORTS.

"TONNING," WITH PART
OF COLDSTREAM GUARDS.



"SIMLA" AND
"SIDON."

"HIMALAYA." 8TH HUSSARS, PART OF
17TH LANCERS, 370 HORSES.

"JASON."
LIGHT CAVALRY.

"EMU." 42ND
REGIMENT.

VARNA.

"KANGAROO."
FUSILIER GUARDS.

"COURIER."

"SIMOOM," FRENCH CAMP.
COLDSTREAMS.

ZOUAVES' CAMP.

"AGAMEMNON," "HARDINGER,"
ARTILLERY.

"W. KENNEDY,"
ENGINEERS.

"MELBOURNE."



"CITY OF LONDON" "MEGERA"
41ST REGIMENT

"VULCAN."
30TH REGIMENT.

HOSPITAL
SHIP.

TRANSPORTS.

"EMPEROR," "MONTEBELLO,"
7TH FUSILIERS. F. R.-ADMIRAL

ENGLISH
TRANSPORTS.

"TYNEMOUTH."
44TH REGIMENT.

"STAR OF
THE SOUTH."

"DUNBAR."
79TH REGIMENT.

"RETRIBUTION,"
COMING IN.

TURKISH FORT.

THE TRANSPORT FLEET EMBARKING THE TROOPS, AT VARNA.



SEBASTOPOL.—FROM AN ORIGINAL DRAWING.

the foreign Greeks thus abetting against the Divan its Greek subjects, to the profit of Russia; and no doubt, suborned by Russian gold, and urged on by Russian instigations. On the 1st of April, the Turkish troops, near Janina, in Albania, obtained a small advantage over these marauding enemies, who, according to the laws of war and of nations, were little better than freebooters. A step taken by our Ambassador, about the time when the intelligence of this victory reached Constantinople, combined with that intelligence to elate the spirits of the Divan. Lord Stratford de Redcliffe issued a circular to all our Consuls on the 6th of April, denouncing the Greek insurrection, and calling on them to disown its abettors, wherever they were found. The immense expenses to which Turkey was subjected by all these emergencies had induced the Sultan to adopt a very violent, and we believe, in Moslem countries, an unprecedented expedient, which equalled in audacity, though not in bloodiness, his predecessor Mahmoud's massacre of the Janissaries. The Sheikhul Islam, or High Pontiff of the Mussulmans, was deposed, and all the revenues of the mosques were appropriated to the State. It was—to compare Christians with Pagans—not merely like a suppression of monasteries and a seizure of all their effects, but it was a confiscation of ecclesiastical property in general throughout the Empire. This also affected, be it observed, an immense amount of lay property, assigned, for the sake of stability, in turbulent but fanatical lands, to the ecclesiastical protection of titular owners, sacred in the eyes of State and people. It was not, therefore, a time for the Porte to make needless domestic enemies. But, transported by the rapture of his high struggle, and encouraged by Lord Stratford's recent circular, the Sultan struck on both sides, and with both hands. He decreed that all Greeks, within a brief delay named, should quit Constantinople, under liability of the seizure and escheat to the Crown of their possessions, with the penalty of personal arrest added. But here the veteran soldier, General Baraguay d'Hilliers, Ambassador of France, interposed. He besought the Grand Signor to make a distinction. There were disaffected Greeks, and there were faithful Greeks. The tie between the disaffected Greeks and Russia was exclusively a religious tie; it never had been national, and it never could, in any one respect, be so regarded. Now, the religious tie was impossible between the Latinist or Roman Catholic Greeks and Russia, the religion of which was known to be disavowed and detested by such Greeks. Their loyalty to the Sultan was, besides, both proverbial of old, and manifest now. If these were expelled from their homes and occupations, and in so indiscriminating, unmerited, and arbitrary a manner confounded—innocent with the guilty, patriotic with the traitors—and thus driven suddenly from Constantinople, he must reluctantly take his own departure also from that city. No more was required; and the Sultan observed the distinction which had been thus laid before his attention.

We have seen that, as our soldiers went to the East, so our fleet went to the Baltic, before either this country or France had yet formally declared war. The marvellous stand made by Omer Pacha upon the Danube was not, and could not be, foreseen. This will account for the choice at first of Gallipoli as a great landing-point. It was the shortest way to interpose at Adrianople between the capital and the Russians, should these force Mount Hæmus, and burst into Roumelia. Powerful works were even constructed from the Gulf of Saros to the Sea of Marmora, to render, in case of necessity, the Isthmus of Gallipoli a safe retreat behind a new Torres Vedras of the East; and this was the first serious occupation which the English and French soldiers undertook in companionship. But affairs changed in their aspect; and many of the regiments were sent up to Scutari; and some even beyond this, to Bayukdéré, on the European shore, above Constantinople. After it was known that war had been actually declared by France and England, the troops were gradually collected in still more advanced positions—at Bourgas, and then at Varna. When the insolent remark upon the last offers made to Russia (rather than answer to them) was known in Paris and London, all the forbearance of the Western Powers was fairly exhausted; and, on the 28th of March, war was officially proclaimed. Russia followed up the rejection of our conditions by some untenable proposals of her own, based on the same wild claims with which she had started originally. These last proposals were pronounced, on the 7th of the ensuing month, quite inadmissible by England and France.

FINANCIAL CONDITION OF RUSSIA.

We think it must be evident to all readers, from the complicated and wide-spread transactions of arms and negotiation which we have now related, that Russia was, from the very outset, bent upon war—bent upon some desperate effort to achieve a new and predominant position in the comity of nations. She had been, in truth, for a considerable time husbanding her resources and preparing her means for some unusual exertion. In 1853 she had freed herself from the annual interest of certain old loans, by paying up the principal. She then withdrew the sums placed in the public Stock of France and England; issued Treasury Bills to meet the current expenses; and prohibited the export of the precious metals from her own territory. Still, her financial situation in a general war, such as that which she has so wantonly provoked, can never be sound. The ordinary revenue of Russia would perhaps be £32,000,000; but, allowing for the inevitable abatement caused by war in the proceeds of the Customs and Excise, it can scarcely amount to £24,000,000 at present; while the expenditure is enormously and concurrently increased. No doubt the sums obtained just after the Hungarian war, under the plea of finishing the Moscow Railway, were not yet exhausted when this vast conflict commenced. But the stress of it is evident, from the financial expedients to which the Czar presently resorted. He appropriated at once five millions sterling of the bullion which forms the basis of the paper money; and, at the same time, he issued four millions sterling of Treasury Bills. He also invited loans and accepted gifts (praising the patriotism of the latter) from various public funds, from the Clergy, and from the Charitable Trusts of the empire; and when "the Dutch Loan" failed, he levied a forced loan, amounting to eight millions sterling, from his own subjects indiscriminately, and called it a voluntary contribution. By these means he realised, in a year and a half, nearly thirty millions sterling. But all the resources on which he drew feel the pressure of the war, which renders much of the agricultural produce unsaleable, while it impoverishes the Boyard or landowning class by the inordinate and unpaid drain of the most valuable part of their live stock, the poor serfs—swept off in conscriptions. Before the war, the metallic reserve of the Russian Government was worth twenty-one millions sterling; but the notes in circulation amounted to £50,000,000; and while the bullion has since incessantly diminished, the issues of paper have incessantly augmented. If we add to these grave facts three others—1st, that there is an immense Land and Banking Company guaranteed by the State, which company (it is called "the Lombards") holds five millions of the serfs in pawn; 2ndly, that the deposits of money lent by all classes to Government, and *resumable on demand*, were, on the 1st of January, 1853, according to the official return of the Russian Minister of Finance, not under £128,960,000; and 3dly, that the funded debt of Russia amounts to £60,000,000 more,

we shall be able to form some idea of the solidity of Russia's financial condition under the weight of a vast struggle like the present. The financial data which we have used in this sketch will be found in M. Léon Faucher's lately-published calculations of the monetary resources on which the Russian State can depend.

Very different was the financial situation of the two Maritime Powers. England required neither a loan nor any very crushing addition to the weight of her taxes; and the loan of the French Emperor was not only a brilliantly successful fiscal expedient, but a vast political measure which is likely to form an epoch in the social history of France. Nor was the French Government forced to resort to oppressive taxation to meet the interest which the new stock, thus created, was to bear. Many old impostos, on the contrary, from which the country has been lately relieved by the Imperial Government, in its tentative, cautious, and gradual approaches towards the economical principle of Free-trade, will probably never be revived. In England, the continuance and duplication of the Income-tax, and certain new dues on foreign bills of exchange drawn abroad (dues to be levied in a superior method; which was suggested to the Chancellor of the Exchequer, we are informed, by a Mr. Pace, of the City) constitute the chief fiscal peculiarities of our great war budget.

ACTIVE ENTRANCE OF ENGLAND AND FRANCE INTO THE WAR.

With this brief but necessary glance at the general condition of the respective belligerents, we may continue our record of the actual events. And here we are obliged to say that, having landed the English and French expeditionary forces in Turkey, and, as it were, set them down within reach of the enemy, we shall find little to justify any minute journal of their proceedings for the next few months. The war proceeded; and, indeed, one very remarkable part of the struggle—a truly memorable transaction—soon engaged the attention of all Europe; but we miss, in the story of it, the action or presence of the Allied forces. They were near, and took no part. In short, though dispatched in spring, they were not destined to engage the foe till autumn. During that long delay, sufferings formed a greater part of their history than actions, and these sufferings were of the saddest kind in the soldiers' estimation—the visitation of a dreadful pestilence, not the hardships or catastrophes of a glorious campaign. With the exception of one vigorous blow struck by the fleet, our remarks apply to the general attitude of both services. On the other side of Europe, however, something was to be achieved (though even there not much at first), and the reader will perceive that many of the adventures of the Baltic expeditionary force were contemporaneous with the occurrences which we now proceed to mention in their order.

BOMBARDMENT OF ODESSA.

Trustworthy information having come that between Sebastopol and the various Russian stations, from Anapa to Odessa, there was a constant and active passage to and fro of troops and stores, the Allied fleets issued forth and patrolled the whole Euxine, forcing the Russian ships to take refuge in Sebastopol; after which, Admiral Dundas and Admiral Hamelin, with their squadrons, approached Odessa on the 22nd of March. There, the squadrons shortening sail about three miles out to sea, sent a small vessel with a flag of truce, to summon General Osten-Sacken to deliver up to them all the ships, &c., in the harbour, failing which, chastisement should forthwith be inflicted for the massacre of Sinope.

Before anything was attempted against Odessa, some shots from the batteries had been aimed at an English flag of truce (borne by the *Fury*); and it was indispensable to teach our barbarous enemies, by a severe lesson, to respect the laws of nations. Next day, the 23rd, twelve war steamers of both nations were detached from the fleet, and sent within range of shot; the order being to spare the town, if possible, but to destroy the batteries, the magazines, and the vessels in the harbour. The order was scrupulously obeyed in the first particular, and executed with brilliant effect in the second. The detachment of steamers approached, accompanied by rocket-boats; these ventured further in, being a smaller mark for the land artillery, which dared not besides waste its fire short of the covering frigates and steamers. The boats having taken their station, the attacking detachment began a most singular and beautiful movement in file, tracking one the other's wake with exquisite precision, along an ever-repeated circle; and as each vessel touched those points of her orbit which were nearest to the Russian batteries, she delivered her broadside, passing onwards, and made way for her successors in the revolving chain, until her own turn should come again. To borrow a most graphic and striking expression used by an eye-witness, the ever-returning evolution of these graceful ministers of a memorable act of vengeance seemed, in the distance, to be performing a sort of wild waltz together, as they laid low the fortifications of the proud Russian seaport. In the midst of the action, one of the French steamers, struck by a red-hot shot through the hull, caught fire, and returned for a brief space to the fleet, to have assistance in extinguishing the flames. This was very soon effected; and the wounded falcon hastened to take again her destructive place in what may be said to have resembled also the wheeling flight of some beautiful birds of prey swooping at intervals, each in its turn, upon the quarry.

The defence from the shore was at first very spirited, and the Russians are described as having stood well to their guns; but in range these were inferior to the artillery of the ships; and, by sensible degrees, the fire of the garrison became slower. At length two great powder magazines of the Russians blew up in quick succession, while most of the batteries were dismantled, the forts knocked to pieces, and the ruins strewn with the bodies of the artillerymen. When the defences were shattered into a shapeless ruin, and the resistance of the Russians had evidently ceased in despair, and when thirteen of the enemy's ships, laden with munitions of war had been captured, the Allied detachment drew slowly off, and rejoined the fleets. Their comrades who had, from the yards of the distant men-of-war, witnessed the action, descended now and welcomed them, with shouts that might have been heard on shore. What the Russian loss was in slain and wounded we have not, of course, the means of ascertaining with exactitude. The officers engaged have estimated the number of the enemy killed at about eight hundred or a thousand soldiers. The Allies had ten sailors wounded and five killed. Such was the bombardment of Odessa on the 23rd of March.

Shortly afterwards the loss of the *Tiger* (16 guns) occurred. She grounded at the Campagna Costazzi, near Odessa, in such a position that she could not use her batteries against the field artillery on shore. After a short fight she surrendered, and her crew (250) were all made prisoners, and carried to Odessa, where they were well treated. The Captain's (Giffard's) wounds proved mortal; and he told the officers and sailors around with his last breath, that to his death they owed their own lives; for he was going to fire the powder magazine when he was struck down. The Russians blew up the *Tiger*.

PASSAGE OF THE DANUBE BY LUDERS AND GORTSCHAKOFF.

It was about this epoch that Prince Dolgorouki, sent to Teheran to involve Persia in the Czar's quarrel, struck the Sadr Azim, or

Prime Minister of the Shah, with a cane to punish his reluctance. The most imperative instructions had now come from St. Petersburg to the Russian Generals in the Principalities, to effect some great exploit at whatever cost. The frightful significance of this order delivered Prince Gortschakoff and his coadjutors from certain natural scruples and hesitations. Long since, the Czar must have persued the report of General Schilders, announcing, so early as the month of January, a loss of thirty-five thousand Russian soldiers, although active hostilities had then lasted only about ten weeks. There could be no illusion in the Imperial mind, and yet this order is sent to the Generals, enforced by the awful addition, "at whatever cost." To hear was to obey.

We have seen how, on the 15th of March, Prince Gortschakoff had been frustrated in a bloody attempt to seize the island between Oltenitza and Turtukai, losing 2000 men, and yet failing to storm the place. Lüdgers had five days before this crossed the Danube at Galatz. He was in force, having 24½ battalions, 8 squadrons, 6 sotnias, and 64 guns. Gortschakoff, learning the fact of the passage so far down the river to the rear of his own left, determined to abandon for the present his disheartening operations against Turtukai and Rustchuk, and to fly to the support of Lüdgers; thus imparting, he hoped, a decisive character to the advance of that enterprising General. By a retrograde circuit, he passed even beyond the rear of Lüdgers' left flank, and threw himself across the river a little above Tultscha, with 14 battalions, 16 squadrons, 6 sotnias, and 44 guns. He brought with him more cavalry than Lüdgers, though a smaller general force; and their united columns amounted to nearly 50,000 men. The reader is aware that Omer Pacha had decided not to dispute possession of the Upper Dobrudscha; and it is, therefore, nearly incomprehensible, though stated in all the contemporary accounts of these operations, that Prince Gortschakoff should have there taken eleven guns and 150 prisoners. His capture of the guns is more unintelligible than his capture of the prisoners, who might have been the unarmed or half-armed ordinary inhabitants—for the guns must have belonged to Tultscha, which the Turks still held as an outpost, and which was the only place they retained in all that region. This event took place about the 23rd of March, the day of the bombardment of Odessa, and five days before the Emperor Napoleon, who, on the 2nd had, in person, opened at Paris the Legislative Session of 1854—joined Queen Victoria, in a common declaration, purporting that the rupture between them and Russia, and that their alliance with Turkey for the purpose of active and direct operations of war, were now *accepted facts*. Redschid Pacha, General Baraguay d'Hilliers, and Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, soon afterwards signed the tripartite treaty to this effect, at Constantinople; and, still later, it was solemnly ratified at Paris.

On the same 23rd of March, as we have seen, the Danube was forced by the Commander-in-Chief of the Russian army of occupation; the fortifications of Odessa were laid in ashes, and the Governments of England and France agreed that they would at last publish in all form their acceptance of the Russian challenge. These are among the amusements, and this is but the mysticism of history; we will therefore add, at present, only one more such coincidence, or, as the French term it, "*rapprochement*." It is not, indeed, in private life alone that these strange juxtapositions of events may be observed which have suggested throughout all countries a number of well-known wonder-breathing proverbs. The very day on which the long-prepared Greek conspiracy exploded, was the day when, at the other extremity of Europe, by an equally striking and curious *obivium fit*, the declaration of war, in pursuance of the tripartite understanding just mentioned, was issued by the Maritime Powers. Dates are the chords and the discords in the great music of human annals.

The perilous success of the Russian divisions, who had now burst into the Northern Dobrudscha, was soon counterbalanced by a misfortune, the news of which reached the ill-starred commanders in the midst of their exultation. Fokshani, where they had piled up the richest part of their laboriously-accumulated munitions of war and general stores, was burnt. The loss to a struggling military treasury must have been extremely serious; though we cannot specify its amount.

The divisions which had crossed the Danube continued their advance, taking Babadagh on the sea, and Hirsova on the river. All the Upper Dobrudscha, except Tultscha, was now occupied by the invaders; and by April the 3rd their Cossacks patrolled as far as Kustendjeh, which the Turks kept, and which was their grasp upon the sea, at the east of Trajan's Wall. On the north shore of the Danube, the Turks retained nothing except Kalafat, two hundred miles to the west.

Before we pursue the Russian enterprises of April, and their results, in the Danubian war, it may be interesting to our readers to cast a glance over the general circumstances of that period. The first object which strikes us is another of those curious historical coincidences already remarked. On the 7th of that month the alliance defensive and offensive between Austria and Prussia was concluded, the overtures (made too late) of Russia were rejected by the indignation of the Maritime Powers; and our Baltic fleet had left Kiøge Bay, and was patrolling every creek and inlet, not still frozen, of the Scandinavian seas. The two Princes of the Blood Royal, who belonged respectively to the English and French expedition to the East, were among the latest who set forth. On the 9th of April Prince Napoleon left Paris, with Vely Pacha, the Ottoman Ambassador; and the Duke of Cambridge, still more dilatory, was on his road from that capital nine days later—and then, not by so direct a line to their common destination, but via Strasbourg; and, indeed, when the Danubian campaign had reached its very crisis, he was at Vienna. But it was destined that the Allied powers of the West should be excluded from the triumphs, as they were excluded from the heat and the labours, of the Danubian campaign. The troops, both eight thousand men cannot be expected to withstand for ever an army of 60,000. "Silistria still holds out." "It is rumoured that Omer Pacha, on the —, was advancing, at the head of 70,000 men, from Schumla, to the relief of Silistria. The rumour wants confirmation. The Allied troops were still busy encamping round Varna." "The telegraphic report about the advance of Omer Pacha, at the head of 70,000 men, turns out to be a *canard* of the Viennese Stock Exchange. It is doubted whether Omer Pacha could bring quite that number into the field at present. He remains quietly intrenched at Schumla, where he is supposed to have only about 55,000 troops of all arms. The besieging force scattered around Silistria in the necessarily dispersed array of an investing army, numbers now at least 60,000 men, who are very much harassed by the repeated and desperate sallies of the garrison." "The reported surrender of Silistria is not true. The place still keeps the Turkish ensign flying, though the valiant garrison is nearly exhausted. It is a pity something could not be done to succour them. Theirs is a waste of heroism." A curious story is told about an interview, under flags of truce, demanded by the Russians. The Muscovite Commander wished to spare, he said, the needless effusion of blood, by merely informing Mussa Pacha of a fact, viz., the Czar had sent *conclusive* directions that Silistria "*must be taken*;" therefore it might as well be given up at

ence; to which Mussa, stroking his beard, replied that he also had a fact to communicate, viz., "that Abdul-Medjid-Khan had honoured him, Mussa originally (and he was not aware that the mind of his sacred Highness had changed) with conclusive instructions to defend the place, nor would he surrender it if he had but a thousand men, and all Russia was at its gates, with the Czar in person." Thereupon, a sort of Masonic sign is said to have been made by the hand of the Russian Commander, which sign implied an enormous sum in gold "imperials." Mussa's only answer was: "Let us now separate—the interview under white flags is over."

All this, in substance, was true; and our allusion to the incidents here will save us the necessity of recurring to them hereafter. Let us quote a few words more from the electric messages of the time. They are at present both interesting and elucidatory. "The wonderful garrison of Silistria is said to be now reduced nearly one-half. On the — they made another amazing sally, and routed the Russians at the south front. This cannot last much longer. The next mail will probably record the surrender of the fortress. The terms will be mild, it is thought; the garrison, at least, are certain to have the honours of war." (They were, indeed. Of those honours the heroes made sure.) "On the 24th, the *Maréchal de St. Arnaud*, Lord Raglan, and Omer Pacha reviewed together the Turkish army at Schumla." (This was true.) "The troops were found to be in splendid condition." (True—an exact and just description.) "Next day, the 25th, the Russians succeeded at length in interposing between Varna and Silistria." (True again—both the facts and the dates.) "The fortress must now hoist the white flag; the continuous bombardment is terrific; a combined assault by storming columns thirty thousand strong is to take place immediately. Of course, it will prove successful. The brave defenders are worn to skeletons. Nothing can exceed the efficiency of both the Anglo-French and the Turkish troops now lying respectively at Varna and at Schumla. Among them they muster, perhaps, 80,000, or even 90,000. The half of such a host would soon give an account of the Russian forces who are storming Silistria. Postscript: *A most incomprehensible rumour prevails that the grand assault has failed.* N.B. This must naturally be received with caution." We think that our readers will feel obliged to us for this rapid retrospective sketch; and now we can finish the historical reasoning to which facts drove us, and drove us reluctantly. In three short sentences the whole case can be stated. Firstly, the conviction prevalent (and, at that time, a most rational conviction) was this, that Silistria would fall unless a movement of the troops collected in Bulgaria was made for its relief; secondly, the conviction was prevalent (and it was equally just, equally rational) that if such a movement was made, it would most certainly raise the siege; thirdly, *no such movement was made.* Silistria could be saved by a given measure, which was perfectly practicable. Without that measure Silistria would be lost. That measure was avoided. Therefore, may we not fairly ask—was it the intention, was it the wish, that Silistria should in fact be lost? We fear that, if the reply was honestly given, it would be affirmative. But what motives could exist? They could not be strategic. No; but they might be political, or, rather, they might be diplomatic. The Emperor of Russia saw by this time that his calculations, based upon expected dissensions between England and France, and on the weakness of "the sick man"—in short, that *all* his calculations were quite illusory. He was willing to accept the terms then offered. But his honour must be saved—he must not be degraded in the eyes of Europe, or desecrated in those of his own people. His pride must be humoured. Some great success must be achieved, and then he would proclaim that he was satisfied; and that, not from the stress of defeat, or compulsion, but under the influence of his "habitual moderation," he wanted to terminate this quarrel, and relieve the anxieties of the world. *Peace, it was thought, would immediately follow the capture of Silistria.*

If this vile deference to the vainglory and selfishness of the man who had inflicted so many injuries upon the community of nations was indulged at the cost of that community, if the feelings of the tyrant and the despoiler were honoured above the interests of his victims, above the interests, indeed, of the world at large, above the claims of the most righteous of causes, and (let us not forget it) above the blood of the faithful and valiant garrison of Silistria, doomed thus to destruction and to abandonment, we may at least console ourselves with two facts—first, the conduct of Omer Pacha; and, secondly, the conduct and the fate (combined) of the troops in Silistria. Whatever restraints may have been imposed upon Omer Pacha's movements by instructions, originating in some foreign Embassy at Constantinople, endorsed or adopted by the Divan, and then sent in authoritative form to Schumla, they but weakened and relaxed, they could not wholly prevent, the Turkish Generalissimo's operations. A grand and decisive movement ending in the annihilation of the whole Russian army, was, perhaps, averted; but the disgrace and the discomfiture which might have been deemed so impolitic, supervened all the same, in spite of the subtle precautions of an ignoble and ignominious diplomacy. Mussa Pacha's dull valour, and Omer's obstinate activity, defeated all these supposititious combinations of the closet—if they ever existed. Without suspecting them to have existed, the page we have now to write will remain one of the most mysterious in military history.

The operations which we have already described will have shown to a discerning reader that the Russians had virtually evacuated Lesser Wallachia, in order to collect an irresistible force for the crowning exploit of the campaign. Political and warlike considerations coalesced in pronouncing this exploit the most important of all. The withdrawal of the right wing of their Army of Occupation, the massing of troops between Bucharest and Slobodzie, the advance of Lüders, with the Danube on his right, and their own main advance towards that river in front (as the river flows due east before it turns northwards),—all betokened that the enemy was now making a great and last endeavour, in the most elaborate form of combination. But here we must note a curious circumstance, which soldiers will easily appreciate. Omer Pacha, in the face of this grand advance, did not recall his left wing. We have sufficiently explained his probable motives. He felt, so far as he himself was concerned, that he could deal with the Russians, and yet not bring another man to Schumla. Now, when such a large proportion of the invading force retired across the Aluta, this left wing of the Turks became at once an independent army, and, like Hal-of-the-Wynd, could "fight on its own hand." All that Omer asked of them was to operate on the right flank of the enemy, to make as many diversions as possible, and perhaps, ultimately, to harass, or even to intercept, his retreat. We want this to be borne in mind.

General Lüders was rather more forward, and rather readier, than the comrades whose movement he was destined to protect. It was not their fault; six days before his own check at Czernavoda they had broken through the Danube, between Rassoava and Silistria. On a misty day (the 19th of April), Omer Pacha encountered this enemy. It is related that, in the midst of the action, a body of Turks, whom he had ordered to make a considerable circuit to the east, and then to assail the left flank of the Russians, appeared as if marching straight from the coast, guided by the noise of cannon, and the uproar of combat. The English were known to have recently landed at Varna; perhaps some had landed at Baltschik; perhaps,

even some not much below Kustendjed. Who could these be, these columns from the east, except the English? While the doubt arose, and prevailed, a portentous sign seemed to afford the answer. A flag, French and English, were all this time incessantly forwarded; and, on the 12th of the month only three battalions of our Guards remained at Malta, awaiting their conveyance. The pride of the Czar amidst this clash of arms, was still unbending; and, dating from the 19th of April, six weeks were by him proclaimed free for English and French vessels to clear out of the Russian ports. On the 26th of this memorable month the Queen in Council ordered a *National "Day of Humiliation;"* and, to complete our present digressive and discursive glance at the more general, and sometimes very distant, occurrences to which we should not wish to turn aside in the narration of the ensuing Danubian campaign—it was in the midst of this warlike incandescence of all Europe, that Mr. Pease and the other members of the "Peace Conference" proceeded to St. Petersburg, and (almost literally) requested the infuriated Autocrat—to be a good boy. Generals Canrobert, Bosquet, and Martimprey, who had arrived on the 3rd at Gallipoli, began, by their presence, and even by the noise of their very names, amid an Eastern population, to impart a new gravity to the whole Western movement—the character of a great Crusade inverted.

We may mention here—for fear of omitting it—a circumstance which exemplifies the truth of the inspired intimation that the utmost wisdom of man is only folly before Him who knows and foresees everything. Of all the measures adopted by the two leading Powers of Europe in the beginning of this contest, that which united the most suffrages in praise of its wisdom, was the Emperor Napoleon's expedient of sending to the scene of action some of his Algerian army; not only as starting from a nearer point of departure, but, still more, as having been tried in a similar climate and in a not dissimilar warfare. And again, of all the troops in his African dependency, the *Zouaves* were, in every sense, considered to be the most eligible for such a service—European in discipline, and to a great extent in blood, Mahometan in experience—the very men, in short, to teach the rest of the mixed expedition how to avoid the imprudences incidental to such an enterprise, and how to secure its success. Now, of all the corps brought together by this great adventure, the *Zouaves* have suffered, beyond comparison, the most, in sporadic sickness and in general ill-fortune. Moralists or physiologists may speculate on the doubtful lesson: we have only to note the certain fact.

It was on the 16th that Admiral Plumridge sent home the *premices* of the war, the first Russian prizes, five vessels of commerce; and on the 17th four more such vessels followed. They were laden chiefly with salt. The first division of our Baltic fleet—consisting wholly of steamers, 17 in number, carrying nearly 10,000 men and 1017 guns—was speedily followed by the second; this last brought 25 ships of war, of which twelve were line-of-battle. The united divisions, constituted a noble fleet of forty-two vessels, 2200 guns, 16,000-horse power, and 22,000 sailors and marines. The only additions desirable to this splendid armament were a military force (which arrived too late for any but a partial and disproportionate exploit), and a sufficient flotilla of steam gun-boats drawing but little water, which were equipped too late altogether to be of service during the year 1854.

We return to the war on the Danube. The Russians, having seized Hirsova, spent some time in preparing for a great attempt to pass Trajan's Wall; but, though their Cossacks scoured the country down to the very ramparts of Kustendjed, they found that they had selected a most difficult part of the Turkish line to force; and at Czernavoda, on the 25th of April, more than five weeks after General Lüders crossed the Danube at Galatz and, nearly a month after the second Russian column had followed near Tultscha to his support, their united divisions were taught a severe lesson. The Turks, at that place—which is some five miles to the south of Trajan's Wall—once more checked the Russian advance; and, in a sharp action, repulsed the enemy with considerable loss. On the whole, the avenues by which the Russians endeavoured to penetrate into the Dobrudscha were defended for about seven weeks; during which time, the invaders—being locked up amid the marshes of the worst district of the whole Turkish territory in Europe—suffered incomparably more from ague, fever, cholera, and privations, than they suffered in the field. It must not be supposed that this advance along the coast against Omer Pacha's right wing was an isolated movement. On the contrary, it was part of a very large combination, which Marshal Paskiewitch, Prince of Erivan, was, on the 8th of April, summoned from Poland to superintend in person, and in which the famous General of Engineers, Schilders, was to take an eminent part. Marshal Paskiewitch had long since expressed an opinion, that Prince Gortschakoff was conducting the campaign indelicately; and, just about the time of which we speak, there was an immense change in all the Russian dispositions. Their right was drawn back; their left, as we have related, occupied the Dobrudscha, and was thundering vehemently, at the north-east gates, so to say, of Bulgaria; while, now, the various columns which had been countermarched from beyond the Aluta, were massed in apparently irresistible strength all around Bucharest and Slobodzie, and in front of those towns, bearing fast upon the Danube, between Oltenitza and Czernavoda. With General Lüders' army, these concentrated troops maintained their communications through Hirsova; and his instructions were to press forward at whatever cost and to interpose between Varna and Silistria. It was evident that the recent peremptory and dreadful orders from St. Petersburg were impelling the Russians to their last and truly desperate exertions.

SIEGE OF SILISTRIA.

We approach the siege of Silistria. In the history of that great operation there is one mysterious and sombre particular, which the reader will notice. The subject is more than delicate; and we will not, in our present uncertainty, say anything beyond what the duties of a historic narrative imperiously require. How is it that from the 1st of May to the 15th of June the besiegers were allowed to press forward their scientific approaches, and their sanguinary assaults, unmolested by any serious or regular attack from without? A very great Anglo-French force was by this time mustered at Varna; and, allowing for all the windings of the road, not more than seventy miles interposed between that maritime station and the very walls of Silistria, while a much shorter march would have precipitated the irresistible soldiers of the West upon that army of many sufferings which beleaguered the gallant fortress. But several replies may be given, even if unsatisfactory ones, on behalf of our own and the French troops. We accordingly repeat the question, with more direct reference to the Turkish host which Omer Pacha held at Schumla. He had, at the least, seventy thousand men accumulated around that impregnable position, or within easy summons; and his march for the relief of Silistria would have been still shorter than that of the Allies. It was the general opinion in Europe, it was the impression among our officers in Bulgaria, and, *we have reason and warranty for adding, that it was, for about three weeks, Omer Pacha's own conviction* that Silistria, unassisted, must fall; and when we say "unassisted," we mean without some strong and combined effort to

assist it. It was, also, not for a moment denied, that the beleaguering army would have to abandon their enterprise if that effort were made and they were thus attacked. It was, in the end, found that, although not externally assailed in the manner we have described, they were yet obliged to raise the siege; can there, then, be any doubt what the result would have been, if a powerful force had disturbed their operations?

We speak not of any wild advance, or attempt to advance, up the Dobrudscha; nor do we refer in any manner to a general effort to carry the war across the Danube; what we say is specific; it relates to one and only to one, manifestly practicable movement, which, it is acknowledged, would, if made, have delivered the most important river fortress in Turkey; and without which, it was supposed, that fortress must surrender; and this movement *was not made.* We wish the reader to fix the true case in his mind; it is well worthy of his attention. This, then, it is: The general expectation was that Silistria would fall, if the forces in Bulgaria did not move—Omer Pacha, like the rest, entertaining that expectation; on the other hand it was the unanimous conviction of all concerned, that, by a move of the troops in Bulgaria, Silistria could most certainly be saved. And with this expectation on the one hand, and this conviction on the other, the troops in Bulgaria remained quiescent during the whole time of the danger. The very style in which the progress of the siege was adverted to by the journals of Europe is most remarkable, *ex. gr.*—"Silistria had not fallen at the departure of the last advices." "It is rumoured that the besieged made a great sally on the —, and destroyed the Russian works opposite the west front, slaying a thousand men." "The marvellous resistance of Silistria still continued at the date of our despatch; though, of course, a garrison not clearly distinguishable, but strikingly similar to the colours of England, waved at the head of the advancing body. Panic seized the columns of Russia. They wavered, they broke their ranks, a considerable loss was incurred, and the field remained in possession of the Turks."

But yet, the main movement throve. So early as the 14th, great batteries had been erected on the north bank of the Danube, opposite Silistria; and the town was bombarded from morning till night; and, undoubtedly, the Russians now began to show themselves in force on both banks of the Danube, near and around that fatal fortress. On the 28th of April the Russians, being completely established on the south bank, attacked the outworks of Silistria. On the same day, one hundred miles to the west, at Nicopolis, Sali Pacha had a battle with the Russians, who had neglected all the country lying to their right, because they were endeavouring to envelope Silistria in every direction, and they thought they had excluded the western or left wing of the Turkish army from the real business then in hand. Sali Pacha defeated the enemy, killing nearly 2000 of them. In conformity with their usual strategy, straggling and indecisive, the Russians at the same time that they were thus endeavouring to force the Danube from Turna, tried also to exhibit themselves in apparent strength at Radowan, nearly sixty miles to the right. Suleiman Bey, whose rank was that of a Colonel, stormed Radowan, and had the glory of beating the invaders with almost as much slaughter in this place as Sali Pacha had inflicted on them at Nicopolis and Turna. But these reverses of the Russian right might have been expected, when they were weakening it in order to strengthen the divisions destined by them to take Silistria. The assault on the outworks was so hotly received, that full three weeks elapsed before General Schilders had completed the investment. On the adverse shore he piled up batteries of heavy guns, which maintained a continual bombardment; and with those guns he left his portable hospitals (or ambulances) and his reserves. The forces which he transported over the Danube to form the actual leaguer were not less than 53,000 men, while the garrison mustered 8000 only. His artillery, which was numerous and heavy, has been variously computed. Probably the most effective batteries were those which he directed against the south-west fronts; and here, indeed, the fire was severe and terrible. On this side the ground rises in a series of platforms, which could not be surrendered to the enemy with safety to the town. They are occupied, therefore, by outworks which are all-important; for, on the day when they are taken, Silistria is virtually taken. The outworks are called respectively Arab Tabia and Illanli. They are of earth. The Turkish artillery protecting them was repeatedly silenced; the walls behind them were repeatedly breached; but, burrowing in the cavities of that redoubt, the indomitable defenders waited only till the thunder of the guns had ceased, and till the tramp of the storming columns made the ground about them tremble, when they appeared swarming out of the bowels of the earth, and—dagger in hand, rather than sword in hand—flung themselves upon the assailants. The Russians in these great assaults—which, as the siege progressed, were conducted in larger and larger force, committed one of the most incredible military blunders on record. They advanced in heavy costume, and even with their knapsacks on their shoulders. They met those, therefore, who soon neutralised and reversed the effects of General Schilders' artillery. The slaughter on these occasions (and from May the 11th to June the 29th they were numerous) is hardly to be believed. Always bearing in mind this species of inter-act, we may describe in one sentence nearly a month's operations before Silistria: to wit, it was alternately bombarded and assaulted. Armed only with their temperance and their fanaticism, the small Turkish garrison flinched not for a moment. As the earthworks were damaged, it was necessary to repair them; and as the Russians mind (a last resource), it was indispensable to counter-terminate. Enormous hardships and evident risks were to be encountered in these duties. For the most part, the patient Osmanli displayed the spirit of a true soldier. As he smoked, or rather sucked, a pipe in which there was no longer any tobacco (the facts have been witnessed), he lay at the bottom of a trench watching, with envy the better-supplied comrade whose tarboosh rose above the level of the margin—because that comrade worked with the spade, and was therefore on his legs. A cannon-ball sweeps away the red cap and the head within it. The recumbent spectator arises, saying that "Allah is great!" He takes the spade from the yet warm hand, disengages the narghool from the clenched teeth, and fills the brief vacancy—his own tarboosh now surmounting the clay embankment. Soon, the place is again vacant, and a successor equally intrepid and equally serene, continues the excavation; and in ten minutes, it has thus taken, as it were three generations of valiant Osmanlis to fortify one soldier's post in a bombarded intrenchment, and, while doing so, to smoke one pipeful of Latakia tobacco. But when we say that these noble soldiers flinched not, we would confine our observation to that one month which we have mentioned. At length, they showed signs of flagging. The odds were great; the work was incessant; the fatigue was overpowering; the enemy was near, and seemed every day to increase in power; their friends were distant, and had apparently forgotten them. Four men met this natural depression with, in war, that priceless resource, that resource above all treasures in value—intellectual bravery and thoroughbred resistance. Of these four men one was a German, two were British officers (Lieutenants Nasmyth and Putler), and the last was the hero Omer Pacha. This man was destined to save Silistria, but not to know it; to triumph conclusively, completely



GHELENDJIK BAY, COAST OF CIRCASSIA.

gloriously, and not to witness his own success; to win imperishable praise, and die without hearing the first cheer. Butler, Nasmyth, and the Prussian engineer told the Turks that they must not despond because the besiegers were laying powder under the surrounding works. Against those mines other mines could be wrought, and all the enemy's labour would be more than lost; for before they approached near enough to do damage, they would themselves be blown into the air. The Turks took heart again, saying that Allah was indeed great.

On the 11th of May, Silistria itself was assaulted. The assailants were beaten, and lost more than two thousand men. Meanwhile, however, the works were incessantly advanced; and, so convergent were the movements with a view to storm or reduce this great fortress, that the right wing of the general Russian army of occupation was consigned to every mischance; whereas the Turkish left wing, as we have said, was transformed, virtually, into a powerful and dangerous army. On the 21st of May another general assault was repulsed. On the 26th of May the left wing, being now an isolated division of Omer Pacha's force, felt its way eastwards, to Turna, Semnitz, and Giurgevo—in all which places it found, and severely defeated, the enemy. Some such results Omer Pacha had foreseen, when (if we may use the phrase) he had abandoned this part of his forces to themselves. We must not confound these Turks with the Turks defending, originally, that part of the Danube which on the other shore, corresponded with the present position of the advancing victors. Quite otherwise; the conquerors had come from the west, not straight across the river; and their "pivot"


was, properly speaking, Widdin. The Russians persisted in disregarding such casualties; and, on the 29th of May, only three days afterwards—a very fatal date to choose for a contest with the Mussulman—Prince Gortschakoff and General Schilders ordered a combined assault upon the south-east, the south, and the west fronts of Silistria. Hurling from the breaches, the enemy himself acknowledged that he lost that day, between one thousand and two thousand Grenadiers. We are convinced that the loss amounted to near five thousand men. They had used thirty thousand in the attack. It was the anniversary of the Turkish conquest of Constantinople. On the 29th of May, 1453, Mahomet II. took forcible possession of that European territory which his descendants were now defending with so much heroism. Two days after the assault just mentioned, the last day in the month (May 31st), the outflanking left wing of the Ottoman army had pushed to Slatina, and there had won another victory; and, indeed, on the previous day, which was the day immediately following the great assault upon Silistria, they had fought a battle at Karakal (through which Slatina is reached in that direction), had taken six field-pieces, and had slain three thousand Russians. Truly, the position was growing serious, but Silistria "must be taken."

At the beginning of June, when this unfair, this most cruel contest had lasted more than a month, Omer Pacha, whatever diplomatic arrangements might, or might not, have been made, could resist his own feelings no longer. He would have been no soldier—he would have had for his comrades no bowels of compassion, had he remained still


impassive, while beholding so much suffering, so much patience, and so much valour. He was moved; and he moved. On the 4th of June he put 30,000 men in action, and ordered them, with his best wishes, to do something for Silistria. On that same day he commanded his garrison at Rustchuk to try their fortune against the Russian works on the island of Moka; and the works were completely destroyed. A detachment of the column dispatched to the relief of Silistria, entered it on the 5th, partly stealing, partly breaking, through the Russian lines. Mehemet Pacha led this reinforcement. Some of the succouring force were repulsed, and shut out; but they remained near, watching for the next sally. It took place exactly three days afterwards, on the 8th of June. It was by night; and then, over a thousand Russian corpses, about a thousand more of the Turkish reinforcement entered Silistria. On the 13th, five days afterwards, a still more tremendous sortie was effected. Three Russian mines were sprung during the conflict: all their works were destroyed, and the carnage was enormous. At last an end was put to this desolating enterprise. A grand assault (through breaches rendered practicable by the artillery of General Schilders) was ordered for the 28th of June. The Russian soldiers had now been eleven months in the provinces of Turkey, and had never yet seen a Turk's back. They had known nothing but disaster, unvaried even by an episode of success; and, when ordered, on the 28th, to the breaches, stood doggedly in their ranks. Prince Gortschakoff, in alarm, adjourned the attack till the next day. He occupied his evening in the composition of a



CAMP OF TCHOUROUK-SOU, ON THE BLACK SEA.



ENCAMPMENT OF TROOPS, AT VARNA.



EMBARKATION OF FRENCH AND ENGLISH TROOPS, IN VARNA BAY.

manifesto or proclamation which deserves to live for ever. The principal argument in it was that, if the troops of his Majesty the Czar did not take Silistria on the next day, *their rations should be stopped*. Next day came. It is very rare for general officers to be wounded in number. It is foolish, unmilitary, perhaps unmerciful, in them to expose themselves to personal danger, except where an army requires extraordinary encouragement. The Russians were thoroughly discouraged and demoralised. This fact is best shown by the number of general officers killed the next day. Silistria "must be taken;" and when the storming columns on the 29th were mustered for the assault, the gloom in the countenances of the men gave a bad augury of the result. Repulsed twice from the defences, they hesitated to obey when ordered once more to advance. Upon this Count Orloff, jun., General Schilders, General Gortschakoff, and General Lüders placed themselves at the head of the men, crying to these to follow; while Prince Paskiewitch rode up to the spot and addressed them partly with reproaches and partly with encouragements. The assault was unsuccessfully renewed, and a murderous carnage took place. General Schilders, not again destined to take a fortress, the capture of which twenty-five years before had been the commencement of his reputation, was struck by a cannon-ball, which carried off his thighs. General Lüders had his jaw struck away; Count Orloff was killed; General Gortschakoff was severely, and Prince Paskiewitch desperately, wounded. The Turks had not only repelled the assault, but had pursued the assailants up to their very batteries. Some of the relieving column outside had meanwhile alarmed and disordered the Russians in the rear. This practically terminated the siege; for the garrison was again succoured during the confusion of the engagement; and the Russian works were so damaged, that they would have all to be recommenced. Mussa Pacha, struck by a spent ball, died of the hurt in a few hours. Such was this memorable siege of Silistria, which might be compared with that of Saragossa for the bravery of the defence. We believe we shall not be guilty of exaggeration in saying that, from first to last, the Russians lost, under or near the walls of Silistria, 30,000 men.

They now recrossed the river, so thoroughly demoralised, that, had there been a sufficient force to pursue them, they must have either laid down their arms, or been annihilated. They retreated from every point towards Fokshani and Birlat; evacuating not only Lesser, but Greater Wallachia. Skender Beg and some of the other Turkish chiefs who commanded in the south-west of the Principalities, pursued the enemy at leisure beyond the Aluta. It was only in the Upper Dobrukscha that the Czar now held any portion of the further bank of the Danube.

The Allies had meantime assembled, to the number of about 50,000, in Varna and the neighbouring camps; and, as the campaign was finished upon the Danube, they began to meditate some other expedition; and, after many councils of war, it was secretly decided to invade the Crimea, and to attack Sebastopol. Siege-trains were ordered from England and France, transports were prepared, and everything gradually provided. But the cholera attacked both the armies and the fleets, which for two months lay prostrate under this dreadful scourge. It cost the English at least 700 men—the French, including those who perished in the fatal excursion through the marshes of the Dobrukscha, must have lost more than 4000. It was in July that the greatest mortality occurred; and the corps which suffered most, was that of Generals Canrobert and Espinasse, at the bivouac of Kavarlik, near Kustendjeh—the Zouaves being more than decimated. When Khan Mirza, on the 23rd July, allowed himself to be surprised at Karassu, by the retiring Russians, General Youssouf took his fine corps forwards—and in that long march 1500 dropped down and died, without counting the regular daily losses. The Austrians who had seemed constantly on the point of joining the Allies, but without ever really joining them, and who were expected to aid the Turks, but never did, now began to muster in large numbers along the confines of Transylvania. During the next month the discomfited columns of the Czar were all behind the Sereth, and Prince Gortschakoff had been borne in litters to Jassy. General Dannenberg assumed the chief command of the routed forces; numerous vacancies had rendered his promotion rapid; and Prince Dolgorouki, who had returned from Persia, was dispatched by Nicholas from St. Petersburg, to investigate the causes of so many and such huge calamities. On the 22nd of August, Omer Pacha, seated in an open carriage, with Cantacuzene (a name recalling old Byzantine recollections), made his triumphal entry into Bucharest. He published a conciliatory proclamation, and the Sultan decreed an amnesty for all treasons committed during a time of terror and military coercion. In the beginning of the following month the Russian head-quarters were removed from Jassy, and withdrawn behind the Pruth. The expulsion of the invaders was complete; the campaign was finished; and then, and not till then, Count Coronini and his Austrians entered the Principalities, "to protect," they said, a territory which had been effectually protected by its own lawful owners, and which these obliging strangers had, in no one particular, assisted in defending.

Such was the glorious Danubian campaign, from its commencement to its close.

OPERATIONS IN THE BALTIC.

Meantime, the Allied fleets had been active in the Baltic; the French division having passed through the Channel to join Admiral Napier, so early as the 23rd of April. It consisted of twenty-five sail, nine being ships of the line, and, with the English squadrons, made the whole a fleet of about sixty-seven vessels of war. The navigation of the northern waters was not universally practicable till the middle or end of May; and, even when it was, not much was effected, beyond the blockade of the Russian navy, which shrank behind granite fortresses, and the reconnaissance and study of the various maritime strongholds of the Czar along those seas. On the 20th a gallant exploit was performed at Hango, two Russian ships being cut out from under the very guns. On the 30th Brahestadt was bombarded, and the next day Uleaborg was destroyed. Prizes of not much importance continued to be sent home. But on the 20th of next month a check was sustained in attempting to land at Gamba Karleby, where we were repulsed with the loss of 54 men, killed or missing. Shortly afterwards the greater part of the fleet—fifty-one sail, in fact—were assembled in Baro Sound; and the French and English Admirals pressed their respective Governments to send them a military force. This was made ready with great energy by the Emperor Napoleon; and 25,000 French troops, under the command of Baraguay d'Hilliers, sailed in the beginning of August, on board English ships, for the Isles of Åland, which lie across the mouth of the Gulf of Bothnia, half-way between Stockholm and Wirmo, in Finland. The soldiers were landed in company with a body of our Marines, and under the protection of the united fleets. The nature of the soil obliged them to use earth-bags for their batteries; and in one battery alone there were 15,000 such bags. The conoidal rifle balls of the French sharpshooters soon drove the Russian artillerymen from their casemates, while the walls were breached both by sea and land. The *Leopard* threw 120-pound shot from a distance of 2500 yards; and it was afterwards ascertained that 30 lb. or 40 lb. shot will, at a distance of 500 yards, breach granite works. The roof of the principal fort was of iron, and underneath the there were six feet deep of sand; then granite. This roof was

torn to pieces in a few hours. On the 15th of August General Bodisco, having lost his two subsidiary forts, surrendered with 2000 prisoners, who were sent at once to England and to France. The forts were then destroyed; and such was the new and sudden mistrust which the Russians conceived of their boasted defences, that they themselves blew up, a few days afterwards, the fortifications of Hango.

EXPEDITION TO THE CRIMEA.

In the Black Sea, meantime, the preparations for the Crimean expedition were pressed forward with greater energy in proportion as the cholera abated. But so vast was the scale of the enterprise, that successive delays occurred. Originally the invading force was to have sailed on the 15th of August; then the 20th was the day; then the 22nd; then the 26th; then the 1st of September (by which time the French siege-train would have arrived at Varna); then the 2nd of September. At length all was ready; and 53,000, out of 75,000 men—cavalry, infantry, and artillery—with an ample supply of all needful munitions, were embarked at Baltschik on the 7th. The French numbered 25,000, the English the same; and there was a picked corps of about 8000 Turks. In a flotilla of between two and three hundred vessels, this first and much larger part of the united army were transported up the coast to Fidonisi, or the Island of Serpents; from which point to Cape Tarkan, in the Crimea, they would make both the shortest and the most sheltered passage. Being reviewed and found all ready at Fidonisi, the monster armada took its second departure on the 11th, and reached, without accident, the destined shore on the 14th. On that day the troops were landed prosperously at "Old Fort," some twenty miles beyond Eupatoria, or Khosloff, within four or five easy days' march from Sebastopol. Upon this great fortress the columns were at once directed; while the transports returned in haste to fetch the reserves, amounting to about 15,000 men.

We cannot do better, in order to conclude this Historic Sketch, than to quote Lord Raglan's late despatch from Old Fort:—

"I state that the Allied armies arrived at the place of disembarkation near the Old Fort, in lat. 45, at break of day upon the 14th, and before night they had succeeded in landing nearly all their infantry and part of the artillery.

On the 15th the swell upon the shore considerably impeded operations, but some progress was made; and the exertions of the fleet, under the immediate command of Rear-Admiral Sir Edmund Lyons, excited the admiration of the army, and were in fact above all praise.

The surf continued on the 16th (the date of the despatch); nevertheless the disembarkation of the horses and baggage was proceeding with the utmost rapidity.

In our accompanying Number, all further and more recent intelligence will be found.

THE ILLUSTRATIONS.

THE SURRENDER OF BOMARSUND.—(Page 317.)

The scene portrayed upon the front page has been engraved from a Sketch by Mr. E. T. Dolby, accompanied by the following details:—

Down went stones, iron chimneys, sand-bags, &c., and the Russians made a poor reply; the shot falling lamentably short, and the aim being negligent, as if they had lost all heart. About the middle of the day, the man at the top mast, on the look-out, roared with all his might to the Admiral: "They are showing a flag of truce, Sir!" Every telescope was bent upon the fort (the long fort—our biggest enemy); and there, sure enough, was a white cloth, fastened to a pole, and waved in the most energetic manner from one of the shattered embrasures. "Cease firing. Signal flag of truce!" bawled the Admiral. Ours, you know, is the flag-ship; so every other ship keeps a look out towards the *Bulldog*, for signals. A large white tablecloth was fastened to the signal halyards, and run up to the foremast, where it fluttered against the clear blue sky. Every ship answered it except the *Edinburgh*, which did not observe it at first, and fired the last shot at the forts from the ships. However, the Admiral seized a speaking-trumpet, and soon set them right. A boat was lowered, and Capt. Hall (of the *Bulldog*) jumped into it with three or four of his men, and pulled straight for the shore. Some moments of suspense succeeded, as our Captain, with the little white flag in his hand, approached the Russian shore.

The land batteries not having seen the flag of truce from the forts which was held out to the ships, continued to fire, when the flag was suddenly withdrawn from the embrasure, and we feared some treachery; but in a few minutes it was planted on the top of the roof, where the batteries could see it, and another held out to the ships. Captain Hall landed, and jumped on shore flag in hand. I saw him hold the flag above his head, and wave it; but no one came out to him. We were now in a dreadful state of excitement; officers and men were crowding to the best points of the ships to command a view. There stood Captain Hall alone on the shore. All was silent as death. Presently we saw him walk deliberately up to the fort, followed by his little boat's crew, and disappear behind the western angle. Sir Charles Napier now ordered a boat out, and our three Admirals—Napier, Chads, and Plumridge—went off, landed, and also disappeared where Captain Hall did.

At this moment my attention was attracted to an unusual movement among the low brushwood upon the hill to the westward of the forts, when suddenly I perceived hundreds of French soldiers rushing down the rocks. I suppose at least two or three thousand blue coats, and of course twice the number of red legs were chasing each other at one time down in the direction of the forts. The first runners soon reached the gates, and there drew up in one dense column about twelve deep. This settled the question at once. Resistance on the part of the Russians, with three thousand of the enemy at their gates, and as many more within call, would have been sheer madness. Inside the fort, the Governor, an old man with white hair and moustache, laid his hand upon his heart, and said to the English and French officers: "Gentlemen, I surrender myself into your hands, together with the soldiers of this fortress. I believe I have done my best to hold the place for my country and Emperor; but, finding further resistance on our part useless, I place myself at your disposal, as the representatives of the Allied Powers—England and France." Such was the surrender of Bomarsund.

THE RIFLE BRIGADE.—(Page 320.)

The Artist has here represented a detachment of the Rifle Brigade waiting "the assemble," prior to falling in on their respective parades. Dressed of their knapsacks, they are about to go through the customary morning inspection; after which they are dismissed to their tents. The easy, listless attitudes of the figures offer sufficient guarantee that no order had, at that period, been issued for the Rifles to quit the peaceful encampment for a more stirring existence. The men patiently await the bugle-call, when they go through a routine of duty which is daily attended to as a matter of course. Both battalions of this splendid corps are now serving with the expeditionary force in the East. It has ever highly distinguished itself, when England has assumed a hostile attitude, in the front of an enemy. It was at Copenhagen, under Lord Cathcart, in 1807; at Monte Video, under Sir Samuel Auchmuty, in 1808; at Coruña, with Sir John Moore; at Busaco, in 1810; at Barossa, under Lord Lynedoch, in 1811; at Fuentes d'Aonor, Ciudad Rodrigo, and Badajoz; at Salamanca, in 1812; Vittoria, 1813; Nivelle, Nive, Orthez, and Toulouse. It was present in nearly every general action during the Peninsular War; and served under the Duke of Wellington at Waterloo, in 1815.

ENCAMPMENT OF THE GRENADIER GUARDS.

(Page 320)

The Sketch portrays some officers of the Grenadiers Guards listening to one of those interminable tales, related by a professional story-teller, who has managed to find his way within the boundaries of the camp.

The presence of these gentlemen is more to be attributed to a laudable desire of benefiting themselves by their recitations, than from hope of affording any extensive amount of gratification to their listeners. The scene is taken in the vicinity of Constantinople, and the rows of dark cypress-trees rising in the background, announce their proximity to the dual resting-places of the "true believers."

HORSE BAZAAR AT CONSTANTINOPLE.

(Page 321.)

ONE of the busy scenes in the Turkish capital during the encampment of the British troops in the suburbs, was the Horse Bazaar, sketched by our Artist. It is, certainly, a much more picturesque affair than our large building in Baker-street. The scene represented is a small square, with groups of Turks, smoking; in the foreground are British officers bargaining for and trying horses, mules, &c. About the square are houses which serve for stables; and at the doors are Turks smoking, &c.

BRITISH INFANTRY AT GALLIOLI.

(Page 321.)

THE life of a soldier on service is one of unvarying excitement. Whether under canvas, in quarters, or bivouaching in the open country, he contrives to make himself at home as far as capabilities will allow. The changes inseparable from war brings him acquainted with strange scenes; and the necessity of providing for immediate wants fertilises an inventive ingenuity which, until urged by pressing need, he was unconscious of possessing. Occasionally he may find himself admirably housed, and blessed with an ample supply of provisions. At another time he must make his "shake-down" as best he can, under the blue canopy of heaven. Tired and foot-sore, after a harassing march, he is frequently obliged to satisfy the cravings of hunger with anticipation of rations, until the commissariat, unavoidably delayed, brings up the ever welcome stores. Under all circumstances, he philosophically makes the best of the position in which he is placed, conscious that the tenure of his locality is held on a precarious lease subjecting him to ejection at a moment's notice. An order to advance is invariably received with joyous acclamation; and to those unaccustomed to such scenes, the alacrity and willingness evinced by all concerned towards facilitating the move must create considerable amazement. Our illustration depicts a portion of the British Infantry in barracks at Gallipoli. The order to march has just been received, and no enchanter's wand could more effectually convert inactivity and supineness into energy and action than a few words read from the orderly-book has instantaneously achieved. As if by magic dull inertness starts into bustling energy. Knapsacks are repacked, arms carefully examined, ammunition inspected; and in brief space all that denoted inextricable confusion is moulded down into perfect order and regularity. Each man takes his place in the ranks fully equipped, and prepared to move off at the word of command. Such is the effect of discipline.

THE TRANSPORT FLEET AT VARNA.—(Page 324.)

(From a Correspondent.)

I SEND you a Sketch of the Transport Fleet, embarking the Army at Varna. The whole arrangements appear to have been carried on well, on our side of the Bay. The French are hard at work on the Varna side of the bay. They have a number of small brigs and schooners. The crowd of vessels, the constant movement of troops—regiment after regiment—embarking guns, gabions, fascines, and horses, passing every five minutes in rafts, steamers, and boats, is exciting beyond measure. I feel confident we shall do our work; though sickness has pulled us down very much: the men look very hollow in the cheeks, and pale.

This Panorama ought to come out at once, to be of interest. If I live, I will send one of Sebastopol.

SEBASTOPOL.—(Page 325.)

THE town of Sebastopol is situate on the point of land between the commercial and military harbours, which rises gradually from the water's edge to an elevation of 200 feet. It was partly defended on the west, towards the land, by a loop-holed wall, which had been pronounced by one of the first engineers of Russia to be perfectly useless; and plans for completely fortifying the place in that direction were said to have been made; but whether the work has since been fully carried out we know not, though we have a deep conviction that strong defences will be found to exist there:—

None of the sea batteries or forts are of the slightest service for defence on the land side. Indeed, the great fort, St. Nicholas, has not a gun pointed in that direction, and such an armament would be perfectly useless if it existed, as that part of the hill on which the town stands rises behind it to a height of 200 feet. In fact, all the fortresses and batteries, both to the north and south of the great bay, are commanded by higher ground in the rear.

The port of Sebastopol consists of a bay running in a south-easterly direction, about four miles long, and a mile wide at the entrance, diminishing to 400 yards at the end, where the "Tchernaiia Retchka," or Black River, empties itself. The average depth is about eight fathoms; the bottom being composed of mud in the centre, and gravel at the sides. On the southern coast of this bay are the commercial, military, and careening harbours, the quarantine harbour being outside the entrance all these taking a southerly direction, and having deep water.

The Military Harbour is the largest, being about a mile and a half long, by 400 yards wide, and is completely land-locked on every side. Here it is that the Black Sea fleet is moored in the winter, the largest ships being able to lie, with all their stores on board, close to the quays. The small harbour, which contains the naval arsenal and docks is on the eastern side of the military harbour, near the entrance.

The port is defended, to the south, by six principal batteries and fortresses, each mounting from 50 to 150 guns; and the north by four, having from 15 to 120 pieces each; and, besides these, there are many smaller batteries.

The fortresses are built on the casemate principle, three of them having three tiers of guns, and a fourth two tiers. Fort St. Nicholas is the largest, and mounts about 150 guns. It is built of white limestone—which is very durable: the same material being used for all the other forts. Between every two casemates are furnaces for heating shot red-hot: the calibre of the guns is eight inches, capable of throwing shells or 68-pound solid shot. That point where the greatest number of pieces of artillery can be concentrated is probably about the centre of a line drawn from Cape Constantine to the eastern promontory of the Quarantine Harbour, on which part of the guns of Fort Constantine, the Quarantine Battery, Fort Alexander, and Fort St. Nicholas, with some other batteries, may be brought to bear; but these cannot, at the utmost, amount to more than 350 pieces, even allowing that spot to be commanded by 100 guns of Fort St. Nicholas.

GHELENDIK BAY.—TCHOUROUK-SOU.

(Page 328.)

THE accompanying illustration is from a Sketch by Lieut. Montagu O'Reilly, H.M.S. *Retribution*. It shows the Bay of Ghelendik, with the town and distant mountains, on the coast of Circassia. This place was evacuated by the Russians—destroyed and blown up by them—on the 23rd of May last.

Tchourouk-Sou, on the Black Sea, was, at the period the Sketch was taken, the encampment of Selim Pacha. He lost the battle of the 29th July, and recently arrived at Constantinople, in great disgrace. He harangued the passengers in the Trebizond boat in extenuation of his failure. He said, "the Russians attacked my army; but it was not my fault, for I was asleep in the village twenty miles off, and of course could not prevent them. I came up with a reinforcement, but could do nothing, for we had forgotten our cartridges. The Russians took all our tents, but they were so rotten that they were of no use; and as for the fifteen pieces of cannon that were lost, I will pay for them out of my own pocket."

VARNA.—(Page 329.)

WE have so recently described Varna and its military life, that we shall here merely say a few words as to the localities of the Sketches, taken by Lieut. Bredin (Royal Artillery) shortly before the recent embarkation of the troops. In the upper sketch, the Horse Artillery are encamped upon the hills to the left; in the valley are the Guards; to the right of the centre is Lord Lucan's camp; and, further right, are the 5th Dragoon Guards, and the 1st Royal Dragoons; and in the right-hand foreground is the road to Varna. In the second, or lower, Sketch, above the Lake of Varna, is the English Camp; opposite are the French Cavalry. On the right is the town of Varna; and in the bay are French transports. Opposite is Captain Woodhouse's battery for transport.

THE BATTLE OF OLTENITZA, FROM TURTUKAI.

(Page 332.)

THIS very spirited scene is well described in the narrative. The accompanying illustration is from a coloured drawing made by Major Dixon, from whom it was obligingly brought by the Earl of Carlisle, as a present to Lord Dudley Coutts Stuart, M.P., who has kindly placed this interesting picture at our disposal. In the foreground is Omer Pacha.

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